Thirty Years of Transition: Power That Was Never Surrendered
In some cases, former senior officials of the State Security and the Party of Labour were even granted U.S. visas and settled in the United States, where they built new economic and political networks, never facing sanctions of any kind.
By Flamur Bucpapaj
In certain instances — including my own personal case — former State Security collaborators have organized aggressive protests to block my entry into the market economy and prevent me from establishing any private business activity.
When, in the early 1990s, the communist regime in Albania announced the end of its political rule and the Party of Labour declared itself “reformed,” many Albanians believed there would finally be a decisive break between the past and the future. But history revealed that this “end” was, in reality, a carefully managed reorganization of the old elite, not its dismantlement.
Former State Security collaborators, leaders of the repressive apparatus, and individuals linked to the Central Committee did not disappear from the public stage. On the contrary, they were strategically placed across the entire political spectrum. Some positioned themselves in the newly formed opposition parties, presenting themselves as “new democrats,” while others remained embedded in the structures of the Socialist Party, the direct successor of the Party of Labour.
Many were not merely former functionaries: they were masters of manipulation, sociopaths capable of exploiting any human weakness, spies who did not hesitate to betray even their closest associates, without guilt, without principles, and without mercy. They were perfect actors in the role of the “new democratic man,” while behind the scenes they continued to use the same old networks of control and influence.
The Party of Labour only appeared to relinquish power. In reality, power did not change hands; only the costume changed. From an open dictatorship, the old elite shifted to a controlled pluralist system, where the new parties were infiltrated by former State Security structures, ensuring that no real reform could ever threaten their economic and political base.
An Economy Under Capture: Public Contracts, Wealth, and Organized Crime
Today, more than three decades later, this caste controls everything: national assets, state institutions, the major media outlets, and even the justice system. Public tenders — the primary source of rapid enrichment during the transition — have become the private property of this elite. Through shell companies, political connections, and procedural manipulations, they secure every major contract, leaving the economy in the hands of a small group of individuals.
But that is not enough: many have directly or indirectly entered the world of drug trafficking. The mass cultivation of cannabis in Albania, the international cocaine and heroin trafficking networks, and the laundering of illicit profits into legal businesses have made organized crime and politics two sides of the same coin.
The Occupation of Natural Assets
In this process of enrichment, the country’s natural resources have also been seized. Tourist zones such as Valbona, Theth, the southern coastline, and many villages with exceptional potential have been filled with illegal constructions — often by individuals connected to the old power structures and organized crime. The law does not apply to them; every obstacle is resolved through money, pressure, or political connections.
Western Complicity
What makes this reality even more alarming is the silence — and in some cases, cooperation — of the West. None of the key leaders of the Party of Labour, the State Security, or other repressive structures were ever sanctioned by the United States or EU countries. On the contrary, many received visas, residence permits, and even relocated with their families to the U.S. and other Western nations.
Instead of supporting the dismantling of the old system, Western allies often turned a blind eye, accepting the reality of a deformed democracy. This silence makes them complicit, because a fake democracy is more dangerous than an open dictatorship: it legitimizes the same caste that holds the country hostage, while giving its power an international seal of approval.
Investigative Report: Post-1990 Strategy of Former State Security Structures and the Party of Labour Leadership
After 1990, Albania entered a political transition officially declared as a shift from a one-party system to pluralism. But documents, testimonies, and concrete developments reveal that much of the State Security elite and the Party of Labour leadership did not truly lose power; instead, they reorganized, maintaining economic, political, and social control over the country.
A key element in this process is the so-called “Article 5 of the State Security Platform” — an internal action plan prepared before the formal surrender of power.
Article 5 of the State Security Platform (Pre-Surrender of Power)
According to internal sources, this article outlined the following:
Simulated transfer of power: Power would appear to be handed over, but in reality, an economic and political lobby would be built behind the scenes.
Infiltration: Selected individuals from the old structures would be inserted into the ranks of new political parties (including the opposition) to control decision-making and block genuine reform.
Asset capture: State property and the assets of former persecuted owners would, in new forms, return to the same individuals and networks.
Destruction of the opposition: Slander, infiltration, and propaganda operations would be used to weaken and overthrow the Democratic Party and any real opposition force.
Corruption of international actors: Relationships and deals would be cultivated to ensure the silence of international bodies regarding illicit activities.
Institutional capture: All strategic sectors — justice, police, business, media — would be led by trusted figures of the old system.
Control of international image: The opposition would be tarnished internationally through disinformation and diplomatic lobbying.
Practical Consequences of the Plan
Over the decades following 1990, the consequences of this strategy became evident in key areas:
a) Economic capture and public tenders
Public tenders often awarded to former State Security networks or their family and social circles.
Strategic investments, especially in infrastructure and public sectors, controlled by the same individuals, blocking real competition.
b) Organized crime and trafficking
Parts of these networks transformed into drug trafficking bosses, using state structures as shields.
Law enforcement bent to protect such activities.
c) Tourism and the seizure of protected areas
Tourist villages like Valbona, Theth, and coastal zones filled with illegal constructions controlled by these networks.
Later legalizations served to launder capital earned from illegal activities.
d) Marginalization of the formerly persecuted
Former property owners and persecuted families denied genuine restitution.
In certain cases, including my own, former State Security collaborators organized aggressive protests to block my entry into the market economy and prevent private enterprise.
The Silence of the West
Despite knowledge of this reality, many Western actors took no visible measures.
Some former high-ranking State Security and Party of Labour officials were granted U.S. visas and settled in America, creating new economic and political networks.
This model of transition — democratic in appearance but essentially a reorganization of the old elite — has kept Albania trapped for over 30 years in a system where real power has never changed hands.
Breaking the Cycle Requires
Independent national and international investigations into wealth acquired after 1990.
Full declassification of State Security files and open archives.
Real implementation of lustration and transparency laws.
A Country Stuck in Transition
Albania today does not suffer from a lack of formal pluralism, but from the absence of a real break from the dictatorship’s legacy. The old elites have maintained control simply by changing language, symbols, and alliances. Meanwhile, the wounds of the past remain open, and denied justice continues to weigh on generations.
If this reality is not acknowledged and addressed, Albania will remain trapped in a transition where power never truly flows from the people, but is merely recycled within the same caste. And thus, “change” will remain an empty word, while history repeats itself — as it has for over thirty years.
