THE HAGUE, JUSTICE, AND THE DIVISION ALBANIANS MUST NOT ALLOW
By Flamur Buçpapaj
The judgment delivered on September 16, 2026, against Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi, and Jakup Krasniqi has opened one of the most important and painful moments in Kosovo’s post-war history. But one legal truth must be stated from the outset, a truth that is often lost in the political debate: a first-instance judgment is not necessarily the end of the process.
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague are a special judicial institution established on the basis of an international agreement, a constitutional amendment in Kosovo, and the Law on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. Article 162 of the Constitution of Kosovo and the relevant law established this special judicial system. The Specialist Chambers are independent from Kosovo’s ordinary institutions. Therefore, the regular Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo must not be confused with the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court, which is part of the Specialist Chambers system itself.
The Hague system has been structured at several levels: trial proceedings, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, and the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court. The Specialist Chambers themselves explain that after a judgment, a convicted person has the right to appeal before a designated Court of Appeals Panel and, under certain conditions, may also have a legal remedy before a Supreme Court Panel.
Here lies a very important distinction: the Constitutional Court of Kosovo is not a “super court” that can take a Hague judgment and directly annul it. The Specialist Chambers have their own judicial system, which also includes the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court.
This Constitutional Chamber has a specific role. Once the other legal remedies provided by law have been exhausted, individuals who claim that their fundamental rights or freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of Kosovo were violated during the proceedings may bring their claims before this Chamber. This means that the legal process does not simply end with the announcement of the first-instance judgment.
The first step is the appeal. The defense may challenge the judgment on the grounds permitted by law and the rules of procedure. Then, if the legal conditions are met, there may also be a route to the Supreme Court of the Specialist Chambers. Only after the other legal remedies have been exhausted may constitutional claims concerning violations of constitutional rights be brought before the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court.
This is not a hypothetical route. There have been concrete cases in which persons convicted by the Specialist Chambers have filed constitutional complaints after proceedings at the trial, appellate, and Supreme Court levels. For example, in the case of Salih Mustafa, the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court examined claims relating to proceedings at all three judicial levels. Hashim Thaçi has also previously submitted a constitutional referral in which, among other things, he alleged violations of the right to be tried by a tribunal established by law and raised issues concerning the jurisdiction of the Specialist Chambers.
Therefore, before declaring that everything has ended, the entire legal mechanism must be understood. But beyond justice, this moment should also compel us to undertake a political and national analysis.
The question is simple and serious: did the state of Kosovo and the state of Albania do everything they could, within the law, to provide institutional, historical, and legal support to the people who led the Kosovo war? This question does not mean that a government should interfere with court decisions. No. Judicial independence must be respected.
But states have other responsibilities: to document history, preserve archives, provide expertise, support legal defense when permitted by law, present the historical context, and ensure that the historical truth of a people is not reduced solely to a criminal proceeding.
At this point, I believe that Kosovo and Albania must conduct a very serious analysis of what they have done and what more they could have done.
But this moment has also brought another wound to the surface: the deepening political, social, and psychological division between Kosovo and Albania. We must say this without fear and without complexes.
Kosovo is an independent state. Albania is an independent state. Kosovo has the right to build its institutions, policies, and state identity. Albania has the same right.
But statehood must not turn into national hostility, and state identity must not be used to deny the historical, linguistic, and cultural ties between the Albanians of Kosovo and the Albanian nation.
In recent years, we have witnessed a political distancing that cannot be denied. Political leaderships in Pristina and Tirana have often clashed and held different positions on important issues. Instead of these differences remaining within normal political debate, in some cases they have developed into a broader climate of distrust.
And here we must be fair. It is not right to identify all of Kosovo with the positions of certain individuals. It is not right to identify all of Albania with the mistakes of certain politicians.
But it is also wrong to deny that there are limited, yet real, phenomena of hateful language and contempt toward Albania.
There have been cases in which individuals presenting themselves as “intellectuals” have used insulting language toward Albania and Albanians from Albania. There have also been cases of unacceptable symbolic acts against the Albanian flag.
These are limited but real phenomena. And precisely because they are limited, we must not allow them to become a symbol of Kosovo.
Kosovo is not that. Albania is not Kosovo’s adversary. And the Albanians of Kosovo are not the adversaries of the Albanians of Albania.
The discussion about a “Kosovar nation” also requires great caution. A Kosovar state identity and citizenship of the Republic of Kosovo can and should be respected. But a state identity does not have to be built by denying Albanian national identity.
Kosovo Albanians have their own distinct history, their own experience of war and state-building, but they are also part of the history of the Albanian nation.
This does not undermine Kosovo’s independence. On the contrary, a Kosovo confident in its state identity does not need to build walls against Albania.
Nor should Albania treat Kosovo as a territory dependent upon it.
The relationship we should build is a relationship between two equal, sovereign, and respected Albanian states, cooperating in the fields of economy, culture, education, security, diplomacy, and the protection of common interests.
Today, after the Hague judgment, this becomes even more important. The Hague must not divide us. A judgment must not be turned into a conflict among Albanians. Pristina must not blame Tirana, and Tirana must not blame Pristina.
We must look at what we can do now.
First, the defense should use all legal remedies provided by the Specialist Chambers system. Second, the arguments of the judgment must be analyzed with great seriousness and an appeal prepared. Third, if, after the exhaustion of legal remedies, concrete claims concerning violations of constitutional rights exist, the route to the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court remains available.
Fourth, Kosovo and Albania must conduct an institutional analysis of their role in documenting and defending the history of the Kosovo war. And fifth, we must stop the internal conflict among Albanians.
Because history does not forgive us when we forget what we have gone through together.
The KLA is not merely the history of one party. The Kosovo war is not the property of one individual. Kosovo is not the property of one party. Albania is not the property of one government. The Albanian flag is not the symbol of one political group.
And no one should use history to create hatred among Albanians.
We may have two states. We may have two governments. We may have different political debates. We may even have different views of history. But we do not have to create two hostilities.
Let the appeal do its work. Let the courts do their work. Let the Constitution be respected. Let history be studied through documents. And let Albanians preserve what unites us.
Because one thing is certain: Kosovo and Albania are stronger when they cooperate and weaker when Albanians turn against one another.
This is the time for justice, prudence, and responsibility. Not division.
Flamur Buçpapaj
