SHISH AND THE CRISIS OF TRUST IN THE ALBANIAN STATE
From the Legacy of the State Security Service to Counterintelligence Weakness and the Challenge of Foreign Intelligence Services
By Flamur Buçpapaj
The State Intelligence Service (SHISH) is not an ordinary institution. It is one of the fundamental pillars of the security architecture of the Republic of Albania, and its responsibility is directly connected with protecting the country’s independence, territorial integrity, constitutional order, and strategic interests. For this reason, the crisis of trust surrounding this institution cannot be treated as an ordinary political conflict. It requires an examination of its history, the manner in which its leaders have been selected, the verification of their integrity, the effectiveness of counterintelligence, and the relationship between the service and political power.
In 1991, the National Intelligence Service (SHIK) was established by Law No. 7495, following the reform of the former State Security structures. SHISH itself acknowledges in its official history that the transition from the old structure to a new intelligence service had to be adapted to the rule of law and that the new service was conceived as a depoliticized institution. In 1999, through Decision No. 61 of the Constitutional Court, the name was changed from SHIK to SHISH.
However, changing the name is not the same as changing institutional culture. The fundamental question for Albania remains whether the separation from the former State Security apparatus was carried out fully, whether individuals with problematic backgrounds were genuinely vetted, and whether the new service was built upon a professional culture connected to the Constitution rather than to successive political structures.
This question is even more important because Albania could not legitimately build a democratic intelligence service while carrying forward, without adequate scrutiny, elements of the mentality, networks, or connections of the former apparatus. An intelligence service may need the professional experience of certain individuals, but past experience cannot be used as a justification for bypassing integrity, oversight, and constitutional loyalty.
This is precisely where the greatest question arises: Were the people placed at the top of Albania’s intelligence structures genuinely vetted, and were they examined not only for their professional qualifications but also for possible links to the former State Security Service, political structures, or foreign intelligence services?
Today, Albania has a specific legal framework for integrity vetting. The Authority for Information on Former State Security Documents (AIDSSH) explains that Law No. 45/2015, as amended, provides for the vetting of candidates and the examination of information concerning membership in, cooperation with, or favoring by the former State Security Service, as well as information concerning espionage or terrorism. The purpose of this process is precisely to guarantee the integrity of candidates before their appointment or promotion.
Therefore, allegations made over the years concerning individuals suspected of links to the former State Security Service, espionage, or foreign intelligence agencies should neither be concealed nor presented as established facts without documentary evidence. They must be verified. This is the difference between a serious state and a state in which security institutions are used as political weapons.
For an institution such as SHISH, verification of the integrity of its leadership is even more important. If a person leading the national intelligence service has had secret links with a foreign structure, this is not merely a matter of personal biography. It is a direct matter of national security. If such an allegation is false, it should be disproved through the appropriate vetting procedure. If documents establish otherwise, the matter should be referred to the relevant institutional and judicial mechanisms.
The second problem is politicization. The law and SHISH itself establish that the information produced by the Director must be objective and independent of political considerations. The Director reports to the President and the Prime Minister and, at least once a year, to the Assembly through the responsible parliamentary committee, while safeguarding classified information.
This means that the Director of SHISH should not be a person serving a political party, a government, or an individual. He or she should be an intelligence professional and a guarantor of an analysis that tells the state what reality actually is, rather than what those in power want to hear.
If intelligence information is filtered according to political interests, its strategic function is lost. A service that does not tell the government the truth when that truth is uncomfortable does not protect the government, and even less does it protect the state.
The third problem is counterintelligence. Albania operates in a security environment in which different regional and international interests intersect. For a NATO member state, the intelligence service must be capable of identifying the activities of foreign intelligence services, the recruitment of sources, influence operations, the compromise of information, cyber threats, and new forms of hybrid warfare.
It is not enough to declare that there is a Russian, Serbian, or other foreign intelligence threat. The professional question is whether Albania has the capacity to detect such activity, document it, and neutralize it. If a foreign intelligence agency manages to penetrate Albanian institutions without being identified, responsibility cannot be attributed solely to the foreign agency. Albania’s counterintelligence capabilities must also be examined.
That is the real test of an intelligence service.
Not how many reports it produces.
Not how many people it employs.
Not how many statements are made about security.
But how many threats it identifies before they cause damage to the Republic.
The history of SHISH leadership also requires institutional analysis. The official SHISH website lists its directors over the years, from Irakli Koçollari and Bashkim Gazidede to subsequent directors and the current Director, Vlora Hyseni.
The existence of this list alone proves neither the integrity nor the lack of integrity of any of them. But it should serve as the starting point for an essential question for the state: Has the integrity, institutional background, possible foreign connections, and compliance with security criteria of every historical leader of SHIK/SHISH been properly documented and verified?
If the answer is yes, the competent institutions should possess the relevant documentation. If there are unresolved cases, they should be verified. If documents exist that raise concrete concerns, they should be examined by the authorities legally competent to do so.
AIDSSH already has mechanisms for this type of verification and has established procedures for examining documents of the former State Security Service and verifying the circumstances and facts associated with them.
This is why neither silence nor a media trial can be accepted.
If a former director has been publicly accused of cooperation with the State Security Service, the documents should be examined.
If he or she has been accused of links with a foreign intelligence service, the relevant security information should be checked.
If there are suspicions concerning the disclosure of classified information, they should be investigated.
If there are suspicions that the service has been used politically, the chain of decision-making should be examined.
And if the investigation produces no evidence, that fact should be made public just as publicly as the allegation itself.
This is how an institution is cleansed: through evidence, not labels.
In this context, serious reform of SHISH should begin with its leadership and extend throughout the entire structure. There must be integrity checks, checks concerning foreign connections, conflict-of-interest checks, classified-information security controls, and an assessment of the service’s actual counterintelligence capabilities. There must also be parliamentary oversight, but without turning classified information into political material.
The Constitution must be the final and inviolable boundary.
SHISH was created to protect the constitutional order, but SHISH itself must operate within the Constitution. An institution that protects the state cannot be above the law. This is precisely why parliamentary oversight, internal inspection mechanisms, and legal accountability exist. The official SHISH framework also provides for an Inspector General responsible for inspections of the institution’s activities.
This is where legal responsibility must also be established. Professional failure does not automatically constitute a criminal offense. A questionable appointment does not automatically constitute espionage. A political allegation is not evidence. But if an investigation uncovers concrete violations of the law, disclosure of classified information, abuse of office, corruption, or unlawful cooperation with foreign structures, responsibility must be determined by the competent judicial authorities.
This is particularly important for an institution in which classified information can directly affect the security of the country.
The current Director, Vlora Hyseni, was appointed to head SHISH by Presidential Decree No. 51, dated April 3, 2023. According to the official SHISH biography, she has a background in law and international relations and worked in the field of intelligence and security in Kosovo before her appointment in Albania. Any specific allegation concerning her, or any other director, should be subjected to the same procedure: documentation, verification, and, where there is a legal basis, investigation.
It would not be serious to predict that a SHISH director will resign or seek asylum without a concrete fact indicating that such a decision has been made. Asylum is a distinct legal procedure and cannot be used as a political conclusion or a media prediction.
But it is entirely legitimate to demand that the institution be accountable for the way it vets the people placed at the head of the most sensitive structure of the state.
Albania needs an intelligence service that is indebted to no one. Not to the former State Security Service. Not to political parties. Not to governments. Not to foreign intelligence services. Not to individuals.
Such a service must be professional, depoliticized, subject to constitutional oversight, and capable of protecting Albania against every threat, regardless of its origin.
Ultimately, the question is not whether SHISH should be strong. That is beyond dispute.
The question is what kind of strength SHISH should represent.
Strength against foreign espionage, but not against the citizen.
Strength against corruption and infiltration, but not an instrument of political power.
Strength in defense of the Constitution, while itself remaining subject to the Constitution.
And above all, an institution in which no one is placed at the top without first passing the filters of integrity, professionalism, and loyalty to the Republic.
This is the question Albania must confront without fear and without propaganda: Has SHISH been built over these decades according to the standards of a modern Euro-Atlantic intelligence service, or does it still carry unresolved problems inherited from the transition, politicization, and inadequate verification of personal integrity?
The answer should not come from propaganda.
It should come from the documents.
