DAČIĆ THREATENS TO RAISE THE SERBIAN FLAG OVER PRIZREN – ALBANIA AND KOSOVO MUST WAKE UP, STRENGTHEN THEIR DEFENCES, AND PREPARE FOR EVERY SCENARIO
Editorial by Flamur Buçpapaj – Nacional
When a senior Serbian politician declares that the Serbian flag will be raised over Prizren, Albanians must respond neither with panic nor with silence. The response must be a prepared state, a modern military, active diplomacy, and strategic cooperation with the United States of America and NATO.
Dačić’s Statements and the Alarm over Albanian Security
When Ivica Dačić declares that the Serbian flag will be raised over Prizren, this is not a statement that can pass without a response. Prizren is a city in the Republic of Kosovo. Any statement presenting the placement of Serbian symbols over this city as a political objective raises an important question: has Belgrade understood that borders cannot be changed by force, or does it still harbour the illusion that it can restore the past through threats?
Dačić is a prominent figure in Serbian politics and the leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia, a political force with historical roots in the era of Slobodan Milošević. His statements, particularly when they concern Kosovo’s sovereignty, deserve serious attention and a diplomatic response.
I, Flamur Buçpapaj, state this clearly: Albanians must neither panic nor fall into a political slumber. We must not declare that war is inevitable, but neither should we behave as though threats do not exist. National security is not built through patriotic speeches, holiday declarations, or politicians’ photographs. It is built through strongl institutions, a prepared military, determined diplomacy, and strategic alliances.
The question we must ask the governments in Tirana and Pristina today is straightforward: if a new crisis were to emerge along Kosovo’s borders tomorrow, would we be prepared to protect our citizens, territory, and institutions?
This question is not a call for war. It is a call for responsibility.
Serbia, Russia, and the Risk of a New Crisis in the Balkans
Serbia does not recognise Kosovo’s independence and continues to oppose its statehood. It maintains political and economic relations with Russia while also continuing to cooperate with Western actors. This makes a careful assessment of its foreign policy and military capabilities essential.
It cannot be claimed that Serbia has decided to start a war solely on the basis of a political statement. Such a conclusion would require verifiable evidence concerning military developments, troop movements, mobilisation, and official decisions.
However, no serious state waits for a threat to turn into an attack before beginning preparations for defence.
Nationalist rhetoric can heighten tensions, weaken the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue, and create uncertainty among citizens. Albanian institutions should therefore seek official clarification from Belgrade, inform their allies, and assess any developments that could undermine regional stability.
The history of the Balkans has taught us that peace should never be taken as permanently guaranteed. But it has also taught us that responses to threats must be measured, organised, and grounded in facts.
Resolution 1244 Is Not a Licence to Invade
Serbia frequently invokes United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 to support its claims concerning Kosovo. However, the resolution must be read in its entirety, rather than through isolated phrases that can be used for political purposes.
Resolution 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999. It provided for an end to the violence and repression in Kosovo, the verifiable withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian military, police, and paramilitary forces, and the deployment of an international civilian presence and an international security presence.
It also envisaged the possibility of the return of a limited number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel for specifically defined tasks, subject to the conditions set out in the resolution. This does not constitute authorisation for unilateral military intervention, the occupation of Kosovo, or the raising of the Serbian flag over Prizren.
Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008. Serbia does not recognise it, but political non-recognition is not permission to use force.
Any attempt to present Resolution 1244 as justification for unilateral military intervention must therefore be challenged through legal arguments, diplomacy, and international support.
Official text of the resolution: https://unmik.unmissions.org/en/united-nations-resolution-1244.
NATO and the United States: Security Requires Alliances and Preparedness
Kosovo is not alone in facing security challenges. NATO has led the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo since 1999. The mission is based on Resolution 1244 and is tasked with contributing to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all residents.
KFOR’s presence is a key element of regional security. For this reason, any change in the security situation must be assessed carefully, while any decision to change the international presence must be based on a professional risk assessment.
Pristina should maintain continuous communication with KFOR’s command and seek clear assessments of potential threats. Tirana should engage diplomatically with Washington, Brussels, and other allies to preserve stability and prevent escalation.
The United States has played a decisive role in the history of Kosovo’s security. However, relations with America must not rest solely on declarations of friendship. They must translate into regular consultations, institutional cooperation, military exercises, and coordination on defence matters.
Albania and Kosovo should insist that every threat to peace be treated seriously and that the security of citizens not become hostage to the electoral calculations of politicians in the region.
Albania Must Accelerate the Modernisation of Its Armed Forces
Albania is a NATO member, but membership in the Alliance does not eliminate the need for strong national defence capabilities.
I call on the Albanian government to conduct a serious assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces and present a clear plan to address existing shortcomings. Equipment, training, logistics, reserves, air defence, secure communications, and cyber defence must all be reviewed.
It is not responsible to declare, without evidence, that the Albanian military is unprepared. But it is equally irresponsible to assume that NATO membership automatically resolves all our needs.
Albania should accelerate the acquisition of modern air-defence systems, counter-drone systems, radar equipment, armoured vehicles, and modern weaponry, integrating these capabilities with NATO standards and systems.
This process must be pursued with institutional urgency, but also with professional planning, transparency, and oversight of public spending.
Anti-Aircraft and Missile-Defence Systems
Albania should examine internationally recognised options for air defence, including:
NASAMS – a modern short- to medium-range air-defence system.
IRIS-T SLM – a medium-range air-defence system.
Patriot – an advanced system for air defence and defence against certain types of missiles.
Mistral 3 – a short-range air-defence system.
These are options for specialists to evaluate, not a shopping list to be implemented without analysis. The selection process must take into account actual threats, acquisition and maintenance costs, personnel training, and interoperability with NATO.
Albania needs an integrated system capable of detecting and assessing aerial threats and providing an appropriate response. Purchasing a single system will not solve the problem if radar, communications, personnel, and supporting infrastructure are lacking.
Counter-Drone Defence
Modern warfare has shown that drones can be used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and attacks. Albania should develop integrated capabilities to detect, identify, and neutralise drones that pose a threat.
Systems that could be studied include:
Rheinmetall Skyranger 30 – an air-defence platform equipped with a cannon and capable of integrating additional systems.
Rheinmetall Skynex – an air-defence system featuring guns and integrated sensors.
Drone Dome – a family of systems designed to detect and counter drones.
Albania should also consider portable and mobile counter-drone systems, as well as equipment to protect military bases, airports, ports, and critical infrastructure.
The priority should be a layered system in which radar, optical sensors, electronic systems, and suitable neutralisation capabilities work together. This is more important than purchasing a single piece of equipment for propaganda purposes.
Modern Rocket Systems and Artillery
The Armed Forces should also assess the modernisation of their artillery and rocket systems, focusing on national defence and interoperability with NATO.
Options that could be studied include:
HIMARS – a mobile rocket artillery system.
PULS – a rocket artillery system capable of using different types of munitions.
CAESAR – a 155 mm self-propelled artillery system.
Mentioning these systems does not mean Albania should purchase all of them. Any decision must be based on an assessment of the Armed Forces’ needs, costs, maintenance requirements, and the tangible benefits for national defence.
Modern Tanks and Armoured Vehicles
Albania should assess whether it needs a limited capability involving modern tanks or whether its resources would be better spent on armoured vehicles, personnel carriers, anti-tank systems, and artillery.
The analysis could consider the Leopard 2A8 and K2 Black Panther, alongside infantry fighting vehicles and tactical vehicles suited to Albania’s terrain.
However, buying tanks is not simply a matter of price. It requires maintenance, spare parts, ammunition, transport, fuel, specialised personnel, and continuous training.
The government must therefore conduct a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis before making decisions. The objective is not to imitate every Serbian procurement, but to build genuine defensive capabilities suited to Albania’s needs and its obligations within NATO.
Albania Must Also Develop Its Defence Industry
Modernisation should not be limited to importing equipment. Albania should also develop its domestic defence industry by expanding cooperation with manufacturers in allied countries and with local companies.
The production and maintenance of tactical vehicles, support equipment, ammunition, and appropriate technologies could create domestic capabilities, jobs, and greater security of supply.
This process must be based on technical standards, quality control, and financial transparency. The defence industry must serve as an instrument of national security, not as a source of questionable contracts or spending without results.
Kosovo Must Strengthen Its Defence Capabilities
Kosovo should continue the professional development of the Kosovo Security Force in accordance with the law, its institutional responsibilities, and coordination with international partners.
KFOR must remain a key element of security. Pristina should maintain continuous communication with NATO and seek clear assessments of any changes in the situation on the ground.
Albania and Kosovo should expand cooperation in civil protection, cybersecurity, energy, transport, critical-infrastructure protection, and emergency response.
This does not mean creating a conflict with Serbia. It means refusing to leave our security to chance.
What Should Tirana and Pristina Do Now?
First, they should request official clarification from Belgrade regarding Dačić’s statements and oppose any rhetoric that encourages changing borders by force.
Second, they should hold consultations with NATO and the United States regarding the security situation and the preventive measures required.
Third, Albania should conduct a professional assessment of its defence capabilities and modernise its Armed Forces according to clearly established priorities.
Fourth, it should accelerate the evaluation and procurement of air-defence systems, counter-drone capabilities, radar equipment, and other modern assets, ensuring transparency and effectiveness.
Fifth, Kosovo should strengthen its security institutions in coordination with KFOR and international partners.
Sixth, both countries should improve emergency preparedness, protect critical infrastructure, and strengthen their institutions’ capacity to respond to crises.
Seventh, Albanian diplomacy should remain active in Washington, Brussels, and international institutions, seeking concrete engagement to preserve peace and security in the region.
Conclusion: We Do Not Want War, but We Must Not Be Unprepared
Ivica Dačić’s statement about the Serbian flag over Prizren must be taken seriously and firmly challenged. But the Albanian response must not consist merely of another political statement. It must be a comprehensive strategy for defence, diplomacy, and international cooperation.
Albania must modernise its Armed Forces, Kosovo must strengthen its security institutions, and both must work closely with NATO and the United States to prevent any military adventurism.
I, Flamur Buçpapaj, state this clearly: we do not want war, but we cannot allow fear of war to leave us unprepared. We seek no conflict with other peoples, but we will not accept Kosovo’s sovereignty being treated as an objective of revanchist politics.
If Serbian politicians raise their country’s flag over Prizren in their speeches, Albanians must raise the standard of their state institutions, defence, and diplomacy. If anyone threatens peace, our response must be readiness to protect it.
Albania must accelerate its defensive rearmament. Kosovo must be secure. Our armed forces must be modern, professional, and capable of operating in coordination with NATO. Every investment must serve to protect the country and prevent war, not to provoke a new conflict.
Without panic, without illusions, and without irresponsibility, Albanians must be prepared to defend their freedom, sovereignty, and security.
Flamur Buçpapaj
