ALBANIA AFTER 1997, THE HAGUE, AND THE NEW NATIONAL CHALLENGE
By Flamur Buçpapaj
In 1997, when Albania was experiencing one of the most difficult moments in its modern history, I was appointed police commissioner in one of the country’s regions. It was a time when institutions were collapsing, the police had withdrawn from many areas, weapons and state institutions had been abandoned, and the country was at risk of descending completely into chaos. In that situation, together with the people serving alongside me, we organized our forces and tried to restore the authority of the state. On March 13, I went out into the streets in a tank, wearing a police uniform, at a moment when many regular police structures had withdrawn and had left behind their weapons and institutions. We got into the tanks and went out to demonstrate that the Albanian state still existed. I knew that I could be killed. I could have been burned alive inside the tank. But at that moment, I did not think about myself. I thought about my duty, Albania, and the restoration of constitutional order. We did not go out for power or personal interests. We went out because we believed that a state, even at its darkest moment, must have people who do not abandon it.
This is one of the reasons why today I view with great concern the weakening of institutions and the absence of a clear national security strategy. After that period ended, I became disillusioned with the way people who had risked their lives for the state were treated. That experience pushed me toward another path. I went to the United States and continued my education and professional development in a democratic system where institutions, the rule of law, responsibility, and professionalism have particular importance. For me, this was an experience that taught me that a state is not sustained by words alone, but by strong institutions and people who accept responsibility.
Today, decades later, the question before us is much greater than an Albanian party-political debate. It is the question of what kind of Albania we want to build in the face of a Balkans entering a new period of uncertainty.
ALBANIA AFTER 1913 AND STRATEGIC WEAKNESS
After 1913, Albania remained a small state in a Balkan environment where borders, the interests of the great powers, and conflicts between neighboring states have continuously influenced its development. During the twentieth century, Albania experienced occupations, authoritarian regimes, isolation, and various forms of international dependency. This history has also included foreign intervention and influence. But serious analysis must distinguish documented facts from political interpretations.
What cannot be denied is that Albania and Kosovo have spent much of their modern history under significant geopolitical pressure. And today, this pressure must not be underestimated.
THE HAGUE: WHAT WAS ACTUALLY DECIDED?
On September 16, 2026, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague announced the first-instance judgment concerning Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi, and Jakup Krasniqi. The Court found all four guilty of war crimes involving unlawful or arbitrary arrest and detention, cruel treatment, torture, and murder. Thaçi and Krasniqi were sentenced to 25 years in prison each, Veseli to 18 years, and Selimi to 13 years. According to the Specialist Chambers, the case concerned events during 1998–1999 in several areas of Kosovo, as well as in Kukës and Cahan in northern Albania.
But there is a very important legal element: this is a first-instance judgment and the proceedings may continue on appeal. Equally important is that the trial must be understood as a proceeding concerning individual criminal responsibility, and not as a judgment declaring Kosovo’s war for freedom and independence illegal. The composition and jurisdiction of the Specialist Chambers concern the prosecution of individuals for specific crimes within the jurisdiction established by law.
Therefore, legally, it should not be said that “The Hague convicted the KLA as an organization.” The judgment concerns the individual criminal responsibility of the accused for specific acts.
IS THIS A VICTORY FOR BELGRADE?
Legally, the Hague judgment does not grant Serbia sovereignty over Kosovo and does not change Kosovo’s international legal status. The proceedings are a criminal case against individuals.
Politically and in terms of international propaganda, however, such a judgment may be used by different parties to support their respective narratives. This makes it even more important for the Albanian side to respond with legal arguments, documents, evidence, diplomacy, and international communication.
Therefore, the question for Albanians should not only be “What did The Hague say?” but also “What do we do now?” The answer should be: documentation, legal appeals, diplomacy, transparency, institutional strengthening, and the protection of Kosovo’s interests through lawful and international means.
JUDGE CHARLES SMITH AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE COURT
Questions have also been raised in public debate about Judge Charles Smith III, the presiding judge in the Thaçi et al. case. Official information from the Specialist Chambers identifies Smith as a citizen of the United States of America. He previously served as an EULEX judge in Kosovo, was a member of the Supreme Court of Kosovo during the EULEX mandate, and had a long judicial career in the United States.
There is no verified public evidence demonstrating that Judge Charles Smith III is under Russian or Serbian influence. On the contrary, the institutional rules of the Specialist Chambers establish that judges are independent in the exercise of their functions and must not accept or seek instructions from governments or other sources.
This does not mean that the judgment cannot be criticized. Every judicial decision can and should be legally analyzed with regard to the evidence, the standard of proof, individual responsibility, the assessment of testimony, and the interpretation of the law. But an allegation of foreign influence requires concrete and verifiable evidence.
SERBIA AND THE STRATEGIC RISK
In February 2026, Serbia’s Ministry of Defense publicly reacted against military cooperation between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo, portraying the strengthening of security cooperation with Kosovo as a threat and reiterating its position regarding Kosovo’s status. This demonstrates that the security issue in Kosovo remains part of a strong political and strategic conflict in the region.
This, by itself, is not proof that Serbia is preparing a military intervention in Kosovo. But a serious state does not wait for a danger to appear at its borders before thinking about defense.
RUSSIA AND THE BALKANS
Russia’s war against Ukraine has changed the European strategic environment. In this reality, the Western Balkans can no longer be regarded as a space detached from the major security challenges facing Europe.
But here too, we must be precise. We should not present as fact that Russia and Serbia have a proven plan to annex Albanian territories if such evidence does not exist. What Albania can do is much more concrete: strengthen its own capabilities, deepen its relations with NATO and the United States, develop strategic intelligence, and ensure that the country is not caught unprepared by any crisis.
CHAMERIA MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN
The Cham issue is a part of Albanian history that must be addressed through documentation and diplomacy. Regarding the Greek draft law/proposal that has been mentioned in the public debate, it should not be presented as an enacted law before the parliamentary procedure and vote have been completed. A law concerning the settlement of Greek colonists on Cham Albanian lands.
But the Cham issue must not disappear from the national debate. It should be addressed through historical documentation, property issues, human rights, archives, Albanian institutions, and international diplomacy.
History is not defended through rumors. It is defended through documents. Property is defended through documents. Human rights are defended through law. And historical issues are kept alive through diplomacy, academia, and state institutions.
DOES ALBANIA NEED NEW LEADERSHIP?
Today, Albania, Kosovo, and Albanians in North Macedonia need a new culture of cooperation. Not to change borders by force. Not to threaten neighboring countries. But to build an Albanian space that is strong economically, diplomatically, institutionally, and in terms of security.
This requires more active Albanian diplomacy. It requires greater coordination between Albania and Kosovo. It requires institutional cooperation with Albanians in North Macedonia. It requires strengthening the Albanian Armed Forces within NATO. It requires modernization of the police. It requires strategic intelligence. It requires cybersecurity. It requires even stronger relations with the United States and European allies. And it requires a state that plans for crises before they erupt.
FROM THE TANKS OF 1997 TO THE ALBANIA OF TOMORROW
I have experienced firsthand what happens when a state becomes weak. In 1997, I climbed into a tank because I believed Albania needed people willing to defend its institutions.
Today, I am not calling on Albanians to climb into tanks. I am calling on Albanians to build institutions that do not need tanks in order to defend the state.
This is the difference between a weak state and a strong state. A strong state does not seek war. It is prepared so that war does not come. A strong state does not threaten. It has allies. A strong state does not forget history. It documents it. A strong state does not allow its citizens to sacrifice themselves and then be forgotten. It respects them.
I risked my life in 1997 in the name of the Albanian state. Many other people did the same. They have often been forgotten. But a serious state should never forget the people who defended it when it was at its weakest.
ALBANIA MUST CHANGE ITS APPROACH
Today, we do not need an Albania that always waits for others to make decisions. We need an Albania that thinks strategically. An Albania that knows what it expects from NATO. An Albania that knows what it expects from the European Union. An Albania that knows what kind of relationship it seeks with the United States. An Albania that cooperates closely with Kosovo. An Albania that does not forget Albanians beyond its borders. An Albania that protects its interests through law, diplomacy, and institutions.
And above all, an Albania that is afraid of no one, but at the same time seeks conflict with no one.
Because the strength of a nation is not measured by the noise it makes, but by its ability to protect its citizens, institutions, and interests.
In 1997, we went out in tanks to restore the state.
In 2026, the challenge is different:
to build a state so strong, democratic, and capable that we will never again need to restore it.
Flamur Buçpapaj
