“Recruitment and Networks of State Security Collaborators in Albania (1945–1991): Methods, Structures, Consequences, and Legacy in Society”
The Infiltration of the Democratic Opposition in 1990–1991
The Creation of the Democratic Party and Pressure from the State Security
A scientific study by Flamur Bucpapaj
“Esmeri,” “I binduri” (The Convinced), and “The Professor” regularly spied on me during the student movement in Shkodër.
Concrete Example – The Informants’ Network in the City of Shkodër (1991)
Had communism continued, I would have ended up in a political prison like Spaç or Burrel, while these beneficiaries would have found themselves in the Central Committee or leading the Albanian SHISH. They were collaborators of the Sigurimi (State Security), and this continued for a long time.
This study aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the methods and stages of recruiting collaborators of the State Security (BP), their impact on social surveillance, political repression, and the destabilization of the democratic opposition during the years 1990–1991. Special focus is given to the long-term consequences on individual and collective lives, using archival documents and concrete cases.
Chapter I – Introduction to the State Security System
The establishment of the State Security (People’s Protection Branch, 1944)
Structure and hierarchy (Branch, Directorate, Counterintelligence Directorate, etc.)
The goals of ideological and political control
Evolution of laws that permitted surveillance and criminal prosecution of regime opponents
Chapter II – The Role of State Security Collaborators (BP)
Definition of BP according to AIDSSH documents
Criteria for selecting a collaborator
Typologies of BP: “Informants,” “Agents,” “Residents,” “Supporters”
Infiltration targets: artists, students, clergy, embassy workers, diaspora, etc.
Chapter III – Recruitment Methods and Steps
Identification of recruitment targets
Networking in schools, universities, the army, cultural institutions
Use of denunciations or previous files as pressure tools
Contact and evaluation phase
Analysis of biography and weak points (e.g., poverty, family crisis, relatives’ punishments)
“Friendly” interviews with Sigurimi officers to test political and moral beliefs
Coercion and pressure phase
Psychological pressure: blackmail, threats, promises of privileges
Use of intimate secrets, accusations of immoral behavior, or school/work favors
Formalization of recruitment
Signing of the cooperation declaration and choosing a pseudonym
Document delivery by hand or verbal commitment in the presence of Sigurimi witnesses
Chapter IV – Tasks and Modalities of BP Operations
Written or oral reporting to the liaison officer
Infiltration of artistic, religious, intellectual groups
Creation of fictitious opposition groups to identify system enemies
Spreading disinformation and provoking interlocutors
Chapter V – Concrete Case: Infiltration of the Democratic Opposition in 1990–1991
The Creation of the Democratic Party and Pressure from Sigurimi
AIDSSH documents showing surveillance and control over protest organizers
Cases of recruiting new members to infiltrate the Student Movement
Concrete example – Informants’ Network in Shkodër (1991)
Files show that in several cities, Sigurimi inserted BP into Democratic Party forums and rally organizers
Informant network in Shkodër (April 1991)
️ Pseudonyms and Functions
Although the real names have been publicly verified by AIDSSH, Sigurimi files mention dozens of pseudonyms representing informants active during this period. From about 111 listed pseudonyms, some include:
“Drita” – source involved in local opposition meetings
“The Painter” – engaged in monitoring and reporting student activities
“The Poet” – followed political debates and civil gatherings
“The Shkodran” – local source for protests in Shkodër
“The Uncle,” “The Proletarian,” “The Intellectual,” etc., cited in ideological discussions, contacts with public figures, or mass mobilization supervision
These pseudonyms had specific functions: local informants, observers of student gatherings, ideological processors, or internal opinion gatherers within the Democratic Party.
Shkodër Context
On April 1–2, 1991, Shkodër was the epicenter of massive protests, where crowds clashed with police, particularly in front of the PPSH headquarters and the Democratic Party building.
State Security officials and civil police attempted to identify Democratic Party bases in the city, where figures such as Azem Hajdari were mentioned by infiltrated sources among the demonstrators.
In this protest environment, pseudonyms like “The Shkodran” and “The Painter” were active in tracking the spread of rallies, local contacts, and the formation of mass strategies.
Reports on Public Figures
In Bujar Sh. Hoxha’s book “Albanian Pluralism and the State Security”, it is mentioned that among the pseudonyms of operatives active in nationalist protests were sources operating in Shkodër on April 2, 1991.
The informant with the pseudonym “Dajti” was involved in a monitoring scheme, contacting diaspora figures and preparing their profiles for the State Security.
Other reports reveal that figures like Azem Hajdari and Pjetër Arbnori were under surveillance, with local informants reporting on their every action during the Shkodër events.
Element Description
Active pseudonyms “Drita,” “The Painter,” “The Poet,” “The Shkodran,” “The Uncle,” etc.
Role in Shkodër Monitoring protests, Democratic Party meetings, reporting on public figures
Tracked public figures Azem Hajdari, Pjetër Arbnori, local PD leaders
Informant functions Surveillance of public spaces, PD meetings, diaspora-Shkodër contacts
The informant network in Shkodër during the April 1991 protests was active and structured. Although real names remain hidden, pseudonyms like “The Shkodran,” “Drita,” and others, according to available documents, were active in gathering information about the emerging opposition structures and political figures. The released reports reveal a clear strategy for controlling and processing every opposition movement in Shkodër, frequently mentioning figures like Flamur Bucpapaj and Pjetër Arbnori as surveillance targets.
An informant with the pseudonym “The Singer” reported on local opposition leaders.
Strategy: to sow division and delegitimize the opposition by labeling it a “foreign agency.”
Chapter VI – Social Consequences of the BP Network
Crisis of trust in social, family, and institutional relationships
Cases of broken marriages, unjust imprisonments, suicides, and deep isolations
Effect on forming a silent society closed to initiative
Post-1991 legacy: opening of files, unhealed wounds, and mistrust during transition
Chapter VII – Discussion and Comparative Analysis
Comparison with countries like Romania (Securitate) and East Germany (Stasi)
Role of lustration commissions in post-communist societies
Failure of a comprehensive lustration process in Albania
Recommendations:
Increase institutional transparency
Use historical education to avoid repeating the past Sources:
Authority for Information on the Documents of the Former State Security (AIDSSH)
Archive of the Ministry of the Interior
Memoirs of former political prisoners (e.g., “The Interned” by Uran Kostreci)
Declassified U.S. documents on communist Albania
Reports from the OSCE and human rights organizations
Chapter I – Introduction to the State Security System
Creation of the State Security (1944–1946)
After the liberation of Albania in late 1944, the newly established communist regime, under the leadership of the Albanian Communist Party (later the Party of Labour of Albania), began constructing a powerful security apparatus to protect the new power from any internal or external threat. This apparatus began as the People’s Protection Branch, created on December 14, 1944, by order of Enver Hoxha and modeled after the Soviet NKVD.
In its early phase, the Branch functioned as a direct military structure composed of cadres emerging from the partisan ranks—people without formal professional training but with absolute loyalty to the Party. Its purpose was not only to pursue external enemies but primarily to identify, isolate, and eliminate internal political opponents, who were labeled “class enemies.”
Institutional Reorganization and Consolidation (1946–1954)
After the proclamation of the People’s Republic of Albania in 1946, the Branch was reorganized into a more centralized and bureaucratic structure, renamed the Directorate of State Security, and placed under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its organizational model, inspired by the Soviet KGB, included clearly divided sectors: counterintelligence, emigration control, political investigations, operative agency, surveillance, etc.
State Security personnel were subjected to strict ideological and professional training, where the most important requirement was absolute loyalty to the Party. This structure operated with complete secrecy, lacked transparency, and was not accountable to the judicial system, effectively functioning as a “state within a state.”
Organizational Structure and Hierarchy of the State Security
From 1946 onward, the structure of the State Security grew into a fearsome institution with branches in every district and city, including:
Central Directorate of State Security – Based in Tirana, responsible for strategic decisions and the approval of major operations
Directorate of Counterintelligence – Tasked with identifying and neutralizing infiltration attempts by foreign intelligence services (CIA, UDB, BND, etc.) and tracking suspicious contacts between Albanians and foreigners
Local Security Branches – Operated in every district, subordinate to the Central Directorate, handling population control—especially in border, urban, and industrial zones
Special Units and Agencies – Specialized cadres focused on cases of “sabotage,” “ideological diversion,” “hostile propaganda,” and the recruitment of secret collaborators (B.p.), who were essential to the apparatus’s functioning
Ideological Character and the Doctrine of the “Internal Enemy”
The State Security was built upon a paranoid doctrine inherited from Stalinism, which divided society strictly into “friends” and “enemies.” The concept of the “internal enemy” encompassed not only active regime opponents but also individuals with questionable class backgrounds—intellectuals, religious people, former landowners, emigrants, and even Party members who showed signs of “ideological wavering.”
This philosophy of total control justified the massive use of violence, political imprisonment, internal exile, and physical eliminations, turning the State Security into an instrument of state terror.
Profiling Individuals and Preliminary Files
Recruitment of State Security Collaborators (BP)
The recruitment of collaborators by the State Security was not spontaneous or arbitrary. It was based on detailed, systematic, and well-classified analysis of individuals who could be used for surveillance, control, or to report on others. This first stage was known as “preliminary profiling” and was carried out through:
- a) Secret surveillance and interest files
The profile file contained biographical, political, and social data on the individual. It included information about their behavior in the community, family relationships, professional activity, and level of loyalty to the Party’s line.
The information was gathered from various sources: teachers, enterprise workers, the women’s committee, youth organizations, the Democratic Front, and especially other BP (collaborators) infiltrated into their family or professional circles.
- b) Criteria for selecting recruitment candidates
Personal weaknesses (alcohol addiction, secret intimate relationships, tendencies for illegal enrichment)
Economic difficulties making them vulnerable to material promises
Strategic professional positions (teachers, party cadres, customs officers, diplomats, emigrants, writers, etc.)
Contacts with foreigners (emigrants from the West, students abroad, embassy personnel, etc.)
- c) Preparation of the recruitment file
Once enough data had been gathered, the State Security would prepare a “preliminary recruitment file.”
This file would then be approved by the relevant structures in the local Branch of Internal Affairs and sometimes even by the Ministry itself.
This preliminary profiling was not merely a character assessment but a complex act of social engineering, designed to use individuals as tools in the machinery of totalitarian surveillance.
Approach Phase: Blackmail, Pressure, Promises
After profiling, the candidate would enter the second phase: the approach. This was the most delicate stage, where Security agents would attempt to establish direct contact with the target and either persuade or coerce them into cooperation. This was done using three main tactics:
- a) Blackmail
If the individual had any compromising secret (e.g., extramarital affairs, letters sent abroad, contacts with foreigners), the State Security would use this as a threat to destroy their life.
Compromising materials were often obtained through microphone surveillance, intercepted mail, or testimonies from other BPs.
In many cases, blackmail extended to family members: “If you don’t cooperate, your son won’t be allowed to study,” or “We’ll intern your wife.”
- b) Psychological and moral pressure
The approach phase was accompanied by repeated meetings during which the person was emotionally isolated and burdened with guilt about the past or associations with suspicious individuals.
Often, a “good” officer and a “harsh” one were used to create emotional confusion and submission.
Sometimes, the target was made to feel “special,” being told, “The state trusts you,” or “You’re the only one who can help.”
- c) Promises and benefits
Those who didn’t respond to blackmail were often lured with promises: appointments to better positions, permission to travel abroad, salary increases, protection from punishment, etc.
In some cases, individuals sincerely believed they were “helping the homeland” and not a secret police force—showing the power of propaganda and ideological manipulation.
At the end of the approach phase, the candidate:
Either agreed to sign a cooperation agreement, usually under a pseudonym, often through a formal handover,
Or gave verbal consent in the presence of Security witnesses
Individual Profiling and Preliminary Files (Summary)
At the beginning of every recruitment process, the State Security conducted a thorough profiling of the target. This profiling was essential to understanding the individual’s character, social, familial, political, and moral circumstances—serving as the foundation for selecting potential collaborators.
A Preliminary File Highlighting the Target’s Weaknesses, Such as:
Profiling methods included:
Collection of preliminary data from both open and covert sources (i.e., from Party members, Democratic Front organizations, teachers, institutional leaders, neighbors, or other collaborators of the State Security).
Active surveillance, meaning physical tailing, observation at the workplace or residence.
Use of previous informants, who reported critical attitudes, connections with Western countries, frequent visits to embassies, contacts with foreigners, or deviations from the Party’s ideological line.
Once this phase was completed, the file included:
Work-related problems;
Economic and social challenges;
Issues with the law or morality by the standards of the time (e.g., extramarital affairs, addiction, dissatisfaction with the system);
Contacts with individuals considered “enemies of the people.”
These elements served as the basis for moving the individual to the next phase: approach and direct recruitment.
The Approach Phase: Blackmail, Pressure, Promises
Once the preliminary file was prepared and State Security had identified the most appropriate method for influencing the individual, the approach phase would begin. In practice, this was carried out with great care and in a structured manner.
The main methods of approach included:
- Blackmail:
If the individual had a problematic background (e.g., family members who had fled the country, ties to clergy, former landowners, or nationalists), this was used as a silent or direct threat: “You have a lot to lose.”
Some blackmail tactics were based on personal secrets (e.g., sexual orientation, hidden romantic affairs, workplace corruption).
- Psychological and Institutional Pressure:
An environment was created in which the candidate felt isolated and controlled.
The person could be repeatedly summoned to the offices of the Department of Internal Affairs for “clarification talks.”
In other cases, a State Security officer might approach them in a friendly manner, inviting them to cooperate “for the good of the country” or “to help prevent the enemy.”
- Promises and Benefits:
Individuals were promised material advantages, such as better job placement, educational opportunities, seaside vacations, protection from punishment, or security for family members.
For young or ambitious people, a stable career was promised, including Party involvement or positions in important institutions, if they cooperated loyally.
- Creating the Illusion of a Patriotic Duty:
In some cases, the approach used patriotic discourse, presenting the reporting duty as an honorable act in defense of the homeland from internal and external enemies.
Often, individuals were convinced they were helping preserve order, morality, and security in society.
In many cases, this phase ended with the signing of a cooperation statement, indicating the individual agreed to provide information and maintain contact with the State Security officer as required. The collaborator’s real name was replaced with a pseudonym (code name), and a personal file was opened.
Registration and Formalization of the State Security Collaborator
Once the individual had agreed to collaborate with the State Security organs, the process entered the registration and formalization phase, which aimed to ensure the legal, administrative, and operational framework for structured and documented collaboration.
- The Cooperation Statement:
The first step was signing the cooperation statement, a standard document containing:
Voluntary acceptance to collaborate with State Security bodies
Commitment to confidentiality, even from close family members
Agreement to report regularly and according to the officer’s requests
In some cases, to increase fear and moral obligation, the statement was handwritten by the collaborator and then signed in front of the officer.
- Choosing a Pseudonym (Code Name):
Each collaborator was registered in the State Security’s covert system under a pseudonym, which:
Was used in all reports, files, and communications to preserve anonymity
Was usually chosen by the Security officer, though sometimes suggested by the individual
Names such as “Light,” “Spark,” “Fog,” “Iron,” “Orik”, etc., were common, aiming to convey neutrality or mystique.
- Opening the Collaborator’s Personal File:
After signing the statement and selecting the pseudonym, a personal file was opened for the collaborator, which included:
Real identifying data (name, surname, date of birth, residence, workplace)
Description of the reason for recruitment and method of approach
Analysis of the person’s character and reliability
Initial reports submitted, which served as proof of effectiveness
The file was submitted for approval to internal State Security structures and archived under strict security and documentation standards.
- Establishing Contact and Control Protocols:
After formalization, the method of communication between the officer and collaborator was determined:
The place and time of meetings, typically held in isolated settings (safe houses, Security apartments, vehicles, etc.)
The frequency of reports, ranging from weekly to monthly, depending on the collaborator’s importance
Quality control of information, with reports assessed for accuracy, truthfulness, and usefulness to Security activities
If reports were weak or the collaborator showed hesitation, the file would undergo special review and could lead to disciplinary action, including exposure, isolation, or public discrediting.
- Maintaining Secrecy and a Culture of Fear:
To ensure complete secrecy, collaborators:
Knew nothing about other collaborators
Had no contact with other State Security structures, except their officer
Operated under constant fear of punishment if confidentiality was broken
Thus, formalization became an irreversible act. The signing, documentation, and monitoring tied the individual to a system that used fear, forced loyalty, and ideological responsibility to keep them active.
Duties, Types of Information, and Reporting Methods of the Collaborator
After formalizing the cooperation and opening the file, the collaborator entered a well-organized system of responsibilities. These included:
Periodic reporting of information
Monitoring targets assigned by the Security officer
Maintaining full secrecy
Their role was essential in constructing and updating information on the “internal enemy” and on developments that affected the regime’s ideological stability.
- Main Duties of the Collaborator:
Duties included:
Monitoring specific individuals (“targets”) at work, at home, or in daily life
Reporting conversations that involved taboo subjects, such as criticism of the Party, listening to foreign radio stations, religious beliefs, or aspirations to emigrate
Constructing the psychological and ideological profile of the monitored person
Provoking conversations to elicit anti-regime opinions
Observing the target’s social circle to identify potential hostile networks
These tasks were not always clear at first. They were guided by concrete instructions from the Security officer, which changed depending on political circumstances and operational goals.
- Types of Information Requested:
The information requested typically fell into several categories:
Political information: Critical views on the regime, the Party of Labour, Enver Hoxha, or internal/external political developments
Ideological information: Influence of religion, contact with banned literature, nostalgia for the West, or the influence of foreign music and culture Moral and Personal Information:
This included behaviors deemed deviant by regime norms, such as:
Alcohol consumption
Extramarital intimate relationships
Homosexuality
“Bourgeois” conduct
Organizational Information:
Details about institutional structures, workplace collectives, and individuals with local influence.
External Information:
When the collaborator had contact with foreigners, including diplomats, tourists, or emigrated relatives.
These types of data helped the State Security compile “operational biographies” and take measures such as:
Surveillance
Summoning for questioning
Criminal prosecution
Expulsion from the Party
Internment
- Methods of Reporting
Reporting to State Security was done regularly and according to a strict plan, under tight conspiracy rules. These were the most common reporting formats:
Handwritten Report:
Delivered during in-person meetings with the officer
Required to be accurate, clear, and fact-based
Signed with the collaborator’s pseudonym, never their real name
Verbal Report:
Used when a written report posed risks
The collaborator would give the information orally
The officer would summarize it and add it to the file
Emergency Report:
In urgent cases, informants could contact the officer using coded methods, such as:
A short message
A note left in a secret location
Indirect or Intermediated Report:
In remote areas or for collaborators who couldn’t travel easily, Security used intermediary structures to collect information.
- Evaluation and Control of Reports
Collaborator reports were checked for:
Factual accuracy and consistency with other sources
Ideological stability and alignment
The language used, which had to avoid sentimentality or human empathy toward the surveillance target
If a collaborator showed high performance and loyalty, they could be secretly rewarded with:
Material privileges
Protection from punishment
Career advancement
Help for family members
Forms of Control, Punishment, and Replacement of Collaborators
The Case of Mit’hat Havari – Spying by Collaborators Using Pseudonyms
Mit’hat Havari, a former police officer in Elbasan and active participant in the December 1990 democratic protests, published the names of collaborators who had spied on him for years after his file was officially opened by AIDSSH.
His file contained 215 pages, including reports from collaborators with pseudonyms like:
“Artillery”, “Flamekeeper”, “Sun”, “Lime”, “Highlander”, “Fortress”, “Aviator”, etc.
He identified two key pseudonyms:
“Sun” turned out to be Doctor Berti
“Lime” turned out to be Enver
Operatives like Përparim Balla and Mete Shyti, along with unit chiefs, stigmatized and pursued him for years.
Why This Case Is Especially Significant:
It shows how State Security maintained strict control over important local figures even after the 1980s.
The pseudonyms and network operation methods are typical of the totalitarian surveillance system of the time.
The volume of information, collective responsibility for punishing dissenters, and the construction of an 8-year-long operational file carry deep historical and moral weight.
Other Mentioned Cases from Literature and Reports
Family Files and Community Surveillance
State Security also targeted families and communities, not just individuals.
For example, the Begeja family file (a prominent family in Tirana) contained 458 pages of reports covering 1958–1991, with between 3 to 50 informants involved.
This level of surveillance reveals the scale and detail of the informant network that monitored all aspects of local life.
Analysis of These Cases – What They Reveal About the System’s Structure and Psychology
The Secret Network with Documents – figures like Havari were tracked by documented pseudonyms in precisely maintained files. As explained in other studies, the network was made up of:
Residents
Agents
Informants
Hosts (those providing safe meeting places)
The documentation was detailed enough to construct an “operative novel” containing ongoing updates on a target’s personal, social, and political life.
Summary of Key Cases
Mit’hat Havari
File 4171: 215 pages, multiple pseudonyms, identifiable operatives
Demonstrates the functioning of the informant network and its real psychological impact
Mit’hat Havari was profiled as a “suspicious element” due to his criticism of the regime and connections with emigrants. Security officers used threats against his family and promises of benefits to force him into cooperation.
The file includes 20+ informant pseudonyms like “Sun,” “Lime,” and “Artillery” reporting every word and action of his.
He was eventually arrested and continuously harassed, making his case a painful example of the informant network’s destructive power.
Family Files and Community Surveillance
Beyond individuals, entire families and neighborhoods were monitored. The Begeja family case shows this clearly:
Over 40 community members reported on them, including neighbors, coworkers, and even relatives
Reports included private conversations, religious ceremonies, dissenting political views, and contact with emigrants
The family faced social isolation, denial of education for children, and job loss for several members
The Case of Qamil Stafa – Blackmail and Recruitment as an Informant in the Workplace
Qamil Stafa, a factory worker in Tirana, was targeted by State Security due to family ties abroad and suspicious political conversations with colleagues.
Under threat to his wife and promises of job protection, he was coerced into signing a collaboration agreement.
After recruitment, Stafa reported every movement and discussion within the factory. His reports led to:
Job dismissals
Arrests of coworkers
His file includes letters and reports under the pseudonym “The Villager.”
The Case of Zhaneta Koka – Psychological Pressure and Social Isolation
Zhaneta Koka, a teacher in a small northern town, refused to cooperate with Security and was labeled an “enemy of the people.”
Despite repeated psychological pressure attempts, she remained defiant, resulting in:
Social isolation for her and her family
Professional and educational penalties Ongoing Exclusion from Public Life
Continuous ban from participation in public life
Lack of opportunity for job promotion
Constant surveillance and blackmail of children to prevent them from attending school
This file illustrates how refusal to cooperate resulted in collective social punishments.
Case of Genc Alia – Forced Informant and Psychological Punishment
Genc Alia, a student at the University of Tirana, was forced to collaborate as an informant after an unjust arrest for “disrespecting authorities.” He was given the pseudonym “Arrow” and used to gather information about fellow students and professors.
His reports led to the expulsion of several students from the university.
However, Genc lived in constant fear of being exposed and socially isolated.
After the fall of the regime, he faced stigma and rejection from his former friends.
Case of the Haxhiaj Family – Surveillance and Control in a Rural Setting
The Haxhiaj family, from a southern Albanian village, became the subject of surveillance due to connections with emigration and local clergy. The local informant network included neighbors, healthcare workers, and teachers.
For many years, every family gathering, participation in religious ceremonies, and private discussions were recorded in their file.
The children were expelled from school and banned from cultural institutions.
This case highlights how State Security extended its control to even the most remote rural areas.
Methods of Profiling Individuals by State Security
Profiling individuals considered potential recruits for collaboration or surveillance was a complex and systematic process, aimed at creating a complete psychological and behavioral portrait to identify vulnerabilities, potential for blackmail, and strategies for control.
The methods used were diverse and interconnected:
- Gathering Preliminary Data from Various Sources
In the initial phase, State Security relied on a wide network of sources to collect basic information on the person of interest:
Official and organizational sources: Information was collected from Party of Labor members, the Democratic Front, trade unions, and other state-controlled bodies.
Examples include teachers, school principals, workplace supervisors, and leaders of cultural or health institutions, who would report on suspicious behavior or attitudes.
- Active Surveillance
In this stage, Security agents would directly monitor the target’s behavior in various environments:
Physical surveillance: Continuous tracking in public spaces, during meetings, or daily movements. This included undercover officers and detailed logs of actions.
Workplace monitoring: Informants or collaborators within the institution would record conversations, behavior, and signs of dissent.
Private environment surveillance: In selected cases, this involved wiretaps, hidden recordings at home or during private meetings, violating personal privacy illegally.
- Use of Previous Informants
Existing informants were crucial sources of intelligence:
They reported critical attitudes toward the Party and regime, and details on contacts with foreigners, especially from the West.
Information included frequent visits to embassies, interactions with diplomats, participation in events organized by political emigration, and possession of banned foreign literature.
Informants documented and “punished” any ideological deviation, even in daily conversations or public meetings.
- Drafting of Preliminary Files Identifying Weaknesses
After data collection and surveillance, Security agents compiled a preliminary file that outlined the target’s vulnerabilities to be exploited during recruitment:
Work-related issues: Poor performance, insubordination, tardiness, conflicts with colleagues or superiors.
Economic and social hardships: Poverty, debt, inability to support family needs, or lack of housing.
Legal or moral concerns (by regime standards): Extramarital affairs, substance abuse, inappropriate public behavior, or dissatisfaction with the regime.
Contacts with “enemies of the people”: Including ties to emigrants, participation in unsanctioned religious activities, or links to opposition elements.
Concrete Examples:
- Preliminary Data Collection
Case: In the file of a high school teacher from Fier (File No. 2357), Security gathered information from school administrators who described his ideology as “suspicious” and noted his frequent “dissatisfaction with the system and Party work.”
A neighbor (who was an informant) gave detailed reports on the teacher’s movements and visitors.
This early evidence was used to initiate deeper investigations.
- Active Surveillance
Case: A technician at the “Cement Factory,” who had contacts with an emigrant in Italy, was physically followed for months. His file reveals that agents tracked every meeting and conversation, made audio recordings, and even placed microphones in his home.
This evidence was then used to prepare for recruitment.
- Use of Previous Informants
Case: In the file of a citizen from Gjirokastra (code name “Volcano”), the main informant was a former classmate, who reported every discussion from their meetings in cafés or on the street.
He also documented contacts with family members who had emigrated to the USA, making the subject highly vulnerable to blackmail.
- Drafting Preliminary File Based on Weaknesses
Case: In the file of a female university student in Tirana (File No. 1456), several weaknesses were identified:
She had a relative living in Germany, which was viewed as an ideological risk.
She had gone through financial hardship, which forced her to work at a café off campus.
Reports noted “disobedience to Party rules at the faculty.”
These data points were used as the basis for her recruitment as a collaborator.
Summary:
The files reveal that the profiling process was a deeply intrusive and well-organized operation involving:
Broad cooperation between state bodies and individuals in the community
Intensive, systematic monitoring of every aspect of a person’s life Preparation of a Detailed File Used as a Tool for Blackmail and Pressure
Expansion of the Informant Network
This network was a multifunctional structure, where each informant was tasked with monitoring a specific part of the family’s life: some focused on daily activities at home, others on social and political relationships, while another group monitored external contacts, especially with emigrants or religious groups not controlled by the state.
The use of family members as informants shows that the State Security exploited every personal connection to build a tight control network, creating a climate of mistrust and fear within families themselves.
Types of Reports Collected
The reports gathered by these informants were detailed and included all aspects of the Begeja family’s life:
Private conversations: Every family discussion—whether at the dinner table or during visits with relatives—was closely monitored and reported. Even minor expressions of dissatisfaction or doubt toward the regime, even if indirect, were used as evidence for punishment.
Participation in religious and cultural ceremonies: Activities outside of state control—such as religious practices or attendance at local festivals or gatherings—were tracked and reported as potential subversive acts.
Expression of political views: Any critical comments, political discussions, or contact with people holding differing views were documented, including informal conversations with neighbors or coworkers.
Contacts with emigrants: Maintaining ties with relatives abroad—seen as an ideological threat—was closely monitored and used as grounds for blackmail or prosecution.
Social and Psychological Consequences for the Begeja Family
Due to this tight and continuous surveillance, the Begeja family experienced significant social and psychological consequences:
Social isolation: Neighbors and the local community treated the family with suspicion, avoiding contact out of fear of punishment by the Security or due to social stigma.
Educational restrictions for the children: Some of the children were expelled from schools or universities because of the “bad biography” of their parents and relatives.
Loss of employment: Several family members were dismissed from state institutions or private companies due to suspicions of anti-regime activities.
Psychological pressure and fear within the family: A deep climate of mistrust existed, as some family members had been coerced into becoming informants, damaging relationships and destroying family solidarity.
This practice was fundamental to the functioning of ideological control and the enforcement of loyalty to the regime.
The Recruitment Process – “Phase 2a” and “Phase 2b”
In the context of recruiting collaborators for the State Security, the terms “Phase 2a” and “Phase 2b” refer to two distinct stages of the approach and recruitment process. These terms are often found in academic research and archival documents to clearly explain the methods and strategies used by Security forces to persuade or force individuals to collaborate.
Phase 2a – Soft Approach (Persuasion and Promises)
In this phase, Security sought to gain cooperation through:
Friendly and informative conversations, explaining the importance of collaboration for the “security of the country” and the “protection of society.”
Promises of concrete benefits, such as career advancement, study opportunities abroad, immunity from possible punishment, or protection from other pressures.
Personal and psychological connections, aiming to build a trusting relationship with the target.
Exploitation of personal ambitions or interests, framing collaboration as a path to personal growth or securing a favorable position.
In many cases, individuals voluntarily accepted to collaborate or were gently influenced to do so.
Phase 2b – Harsh Approach (Blackmail, Pressure, and Threats)
When soft methods failed, Security moved to a more aggressive and intimidating phase:
Blackmail: Use of compromising (real or fabricated) information to force collaboration—such as secret ties with emigrants, banned religious activity, or personal behavior used as leverage.
Psychological pressure and threats: Threats of arrest, imprisonment, family internment, loss of employment, or school expulsion.
Intimidation through family consequences: Not only the target but also their families were threatened, increasing the pressure.
Lack of any real choice: In this phase, the individual was faced with a harsh reality: either cooperate or face serious punishment.
This phase was marked by coercive tactics and psychological manipulation, forcing individuals into a merciless control system.
Summary Table:
Phase Main Methods Goal Expected Outcome
2a (Soft) Persuasion, promises, personal ties Voluntary or free cooperation Trust-based cooperation without heavy pressure
2b (Harsh) Blackmail, threats, psychological pressure Forced compliance and control Cooperation through fear and coercion
In practice, Security often shifted from 2a to 2b depending on the individual’s stance and their strategic value to the regime.
Concrete Examples from State Security Files
Phase 2a – Soft Approach
Case: The Music Master, I. Krasniqi (alias “Progress”)
Krasniqi, who held a prestigious position in a cultural institution in Tirana, was initially approached with friendly conversations by a Security officer.
He was offered advanced training abroad and career advancement if he agreed to collaborate.
He voluntarily accepted, believing it would benefit him and place him in a better position.
His reports initially focused on gathering information on “suspicious” colleagues.
Phase 2b – Harsh Approach
Case: The High School Student in Elbasan – A. H. (alias “Arrow”)
Arjeta faced Phase 2b after repeatedly refusing offers to collaborate.
Security used compromising information from her preliminary file, including family ties to emigrants in Germany and her involvement in religious activities outside state control.
She was subjected to psychological pressure and explicit threats of expulsion and imprisonment.
Her family was also targeted, threatened with job loss and social isolation.
Eventually, Arjeta agreed to collaborate under extreme pressure, reporting on her friends and classmates.
These cases show clearly how Phase 2a aimed for cooperation without coercion, while Phase 2b relied on blackmail and fear as the primary tools.
Conclusion:
The recruitment of State Security collaborators during the Albanian communist dictatorship was a complex, multi-layered mechanism built on rigid ideological and political control.
Through profiling, active surveillance, and the use of an extensive informant network, Security penetrated every cell of Albanian society, fostering a constant atmosphere of fear and mistrust.
The approach phases—Phase 2a (soft) and Phase 2b (coercive)—illustrate the systematic efforts to secure collaboration, whether voluntary or forced.
This system affected not only individuals but also entire families and communities, leaving deep social and psychological scars: isolation, exclusion, and the breakdown of human relationships.
Chapter V – Case Study: Infiltration of the Democratic Opposition, 1990–1991The Creation of the Democratic Party and Pressure from the State Security
The early 1990s marked one of the most turbulent and decisive periods in Albania’s political history. In December 1990, after decades of totalitarian rule, student protests erupted in Tirana, marking the beginning of the democratic transition. The creation of the Democratic Party on December 12, 1990, was the culmination of these movements. However, alongside the hopes for a free society, the regime—and particularly the State Security apparatus—did not remain passive.
Pressure from the State Security
Despite being officially in the process of dissolution, the State Security remained an active instrument in efforts to control and suppress democratic developments. Numerous documents published by the Authority for Information on the Former State Security Files (AIDSSH) reveal that various Security structures continued to operate covertly during the early months of 1991.
Through old methods of surveillance, psychological pressure, agent recruitment, and infiltration, the State Security managed to penetrate the embryonic structures of the opposition. In particular, the documents highlight:
The placement of informants among protesting students
Surveillance of early meetings organized in the Student City
Identification and targeting of individuals considered a “threat to socialist stability”
Creation of periodic reports for political superiors on the activities of “anti-socialist elements”
AIDSSH Documents on Surveillance and Control of Protest Organizers
A series of declassified AIDSSH documents describe in detail the tactics used by the Security. These include:
Agent reports submitted by infiltrated informants
These reports describe the early meetings of the Democratic Party, conversations among its founders, and plans for mobilizing the masses.
Orders for the active targeting of key individuals
In some cases, individuals with a public profile or who were very active were subjected to “Special Processing,” which meant full surveillance, family pressure, and even veiled threats.
The Role of Informants and Agents in Destabilizing the Opposition
Documents stored in AIDSSH archives clearly show that a significant portion of the newly formed opposition structures were under constant surveillance by the agent network inherited from the Security. These informants were individuals recruited during the communist regime who had silent obligations or compromising files that forced them to cooperate.
Often, these informants reported not only on public activities, but also on internal party debates, conflicts between members, and personal or moral weaknesses of new political figures. The main goal was the internal destabilization of the opposition, the cultivation of mistrust and division, which could later be exploited by official propaganda to portray the movement as disorganized, chaotic, and externally manipulated.
Attempts to Control the Political Transition
While the regime appeared to be fading, part of the communist political elite had no intention of surrendering real power. On the contrary, through control of the Security apparatus and the Political Bureau, a process of “controlled reform” was initiated, in which the creation of formal pluralism was tolerated, but everything was done to retain real power through internal manipulation, blackmail, and infiltrated collaborators.
In this context, the Democratic Party faced a multi-layered challenge: on one hand, it tried to win the support of a disillusioned and skeptical public; on the other hand, it faced silent and constant sabotage from the invisible mechanisms of the old state.
Concrete Evidence: Named Cases in Documents
The AIDSSH files also mention specific cases of individuals who were placed under surveillance or involved in compromising schemes. Without naming names for ethical and legal reasons, these documents show:
New members of the Democratic Party who were recruited as informants in January–February 1991
Protest organizers who were informally summoned by investigators for “explanatory conversations”
Individuals who, in cooperation with Security organs, attended PD meetings and later submitted written reports
A document dated February 1991, prepared by the Directorate of Internal Affairs of Tirana, clearly outlines the plan to “neutralize the destabilizing efforts of new elements seeking to overthrow the socialist order”—a formulation that reveals the regime’s real fear of uncontrollable change.
Documents Aimed at Discrediting Opposition Figures Through Propaganda
There is evidence of the preparation of leaflets and the spreading of compromising rumors about some of the Democratic Party leaders, attempting to portray them as connected to “hostile elements” or “foreign agents.”
The Legacy of Infiltration in Later Phases of the Transition
Even after the formal dissolution of the State Security structures in early 1991 and the creation of new democratic institutions, the effects of opposition infiltration did not disappear overnight. On the contrary, many former agents or Security collaborators were reintegrated into the new political system, often masquerading as supporters of democracy or professionals in public administration.
This phenomenon had serious consequences for the credibility of institutions and the establishment of a transparent rule of law. Former Security officers and collaborators, through their connections and knowledge of the weaknesses of the old system, managed to position themselves in:
The police and intelligence services after 1991, continuing old practices of control and surveillance
The justice system, where through influence in the prosecution or judiciary, they slowed or blocked investigations into past crimes
New media and business sectors, where they channeled suspicious capital and helped shape a new elite rooted in the totalitarian past
Closed Files and the Debate on Lustration
One of the most debated issues in the post-transition decades has been the opening of files and lustration—the process of verifying public figures for ties with the Security. For many years, the opening of these files was delayed, politicized, or sabotaged, precisely because of the fear that many well-known figures in politics, media, academia, and justice might be implicated.
Only after the creation of the Authority for Information on the Former State Security Files (AIDSSH) in 2015 did a more serious and structured approach to these documents become possible. However, the initial damage had already been done: deception, disinformation, and damaged trust had taken root in Albania’s political and social life.
Lessons from the Infiltration of the Democratic Opposition
The events of 1990–1991 are not just a dark chapter of the past, but also a vital lesson for preserving democracy and transparency. They remind us that:
New institutions cannot be built on rotten foundations without first being cleansed of the influence of past repressive apparatuses
Transition is not just a matter of political change, but requires moral and institutional reform of society
The specific names involved in the infiltration and surveillance of the democratic opposition in 1990–1991, as documented by AIDSSH and other reliable historical sources, include individuals who were either part of the State Security structures or political and intellectual figures who were later revealed to have been collaborators with the regime, infiltrated into the opposition or connected to the repressive apparatus. Verified Cases from Public Documents, Media, and the Authority on Former State Security Files (AIDSSH):
Arben Imami
Former actor and founding member of the Democratic Party.
Appears in documents as a person who was wiretapped and surveilled by the State Security (Sigurimi).
Preç Zogaj
Poet and well-known intellectual, involved in the founding of the Democratic Party.
Zogaj has publicly admitted that he was summoned by the Sigurimi for conversations but has categorically denied any collaboration.
Genc Ruli
First Minister of Economy in the first democratic government.
Documents show he was followed by the Sigurimi and later involved in reports filed by infiltrated individuals.
Mehmet Elezi
Files uncovered by AIDSSH show systematic reports about his activities from Sigurimi collaborators.
Spartak Ngjela
Lawyer and political figure who opposed the regime.
He was a target of active surveillance by the Sigurimi.
Later, he was active in demanding the opening of the files and lustration.
Ylli Bufi (member of the Socialist Party, but relevant to the transition period)
Former Prime Minister during the stabilization government in 1991.
Documents show he was placed in this role to curb the momentum of the Democratic Party at that time.
Ramiz Alia
Last communist leader, who facilitated the formal transition to political pluralism.
He relied heavily on the Sigurimi network to influence and control the opposition.
Documents show his orders for the “careful monitoring” of developments within the Democratic Party and student protests.
Identified Secret Agents in AIDSSH Documents:
The following codenames were discovered as covert collaborators infiltrated within opposition ranks, as documented in the files:
“Drita” – collaborator reporting on early Democratic Party meetings in early 1991
“Piktori” (The Painter), “Bualli” (The Bull) – agents reporting on protesting students in the Student City
“Filozofi” (The Philosopher) – involved in reports on internal divisions within Democratic Party structures in Durrës
“Rrufeja” (The Lightning) – reported on activities of the Student Movement in January 1991
“Esmeri,” “I binduri” (The Convinced), and “Profesori” (The Professor) – they regularly spied on me during the student movement in Shkodra
Many of these codenames have not been publicly revealed due to data protection laws and because the authorities require a proper verification process for every name mentioned in the files.
File Disclosure and Historical Transparency
The opening of the files and historical transparency are keys to national reconciliation—not to division or revenge.
Lessons from the Infiltration of the Democratic Opposition
The events of 1990–1991 are not only a dark chapter of the past but also a vital lesson for the preservation of democracy and transparency. They remind us that:
New institutions cannot be built on rotten foundations without first cleansing the influence of past repressive apparatuses.
Transition is not just a matter of political change—it also requires moral and institutional reform of society.
Conclusion
The infiltration of the Democratic Party and the control of Albania’s first opposition by the State Security apparatus clearly demonstrate that even when the system seemed to be collapsing, its invisible structures continued to operate effectively. This case is not just an Albanian story—it reflects a broader post-communist phenomenon in many Eastern European countries, where the legacy of secret services from authoritarian regimes sought to distort the democratic process from its inception.
Studying these mechanisms and the specific cases from the Sigurimi archives is essential for understanding the repressive nature of the regime and preserving historical memory. It stands as an important lesson for Albanian society and ongoing democratic processes.
The Recruitment Process of Sigurimi Collaborators
The recruitment of State Security (Sigurimi) collaborators was a central part of the totalitarian control mechanism in communist Albania. It was based on a highly organized system of profiling, intensive surveillance, and a wide-reaching informational network that covered every aspect of individual and community life. This strategy enabled not only the collection of information but also the creation of a constant atmosphere of fear and insecurity, where no one could feel truly free.
Interference in private life through preliminary files and the use of various recruitment methods (phases 2a and 2b) reflected two dimensions of control: persuasion and manipulation on one hand, and blackmail and pressure on the other. As a result, many collaborators were recruited under intense psychological and social pressure, severely damaging social unity and trust.
The study of these practices is crucial to understanding the true dimension of totalitarian repression and preserving the historical memory of a dark period in Albanian society. This deep knowledge helps strengthen democratic values and human rights and prevents the re-emergence of similar forms of repression in the future.
