The Functioning of the State Security in the Albanian Diaspora: An Instrument of Control and Repression Abroad (1944–1991)
CIA Reports on Communist Albania: State Security’s Operations on Controlling the Diaspora
Methods of Control, Infiltration, and Repression
The Role of Embassies and State Security Collaborators
Case Studies from the Albanian Diaspora
The Impact of Domestic Policy on Activities Toward the Diaspora
The Activity of State Security and the Control Over the Albanian Diaspora
A Study by Flamur Bucpapaj
Without confronting and accepting the past, there can be no bright future.
Every society that aspires to move forward must first reconcile with its past.
This study is structured in a scholarly format, suitable for publication in academic journals of history, political science, or security studies.
Contents:
Introduction
The Historical Context of the Formation of State Security
The Concept of the “External Enemy” and the Albanian Diaspora
Structures
Psychological and Social Consequences on Albanian Emigrants
Developments After the Fall of the Regime (1990–1991)
Sources and Bibliography
Purpose of the Study:
To analyze how the State Security operated as an instrument of control and repression against Albanians living abroad.
Significance of the Topic:
Understanding the nature of the Albanian communist regime and its relationship with the diaspora.
Methodology:
Archival analysis, collected testimonies, declassified documents, and existing literature.
The Impact of Domestic Policy on Activities Toward the Diaspora
The internal policy of the Albanian communist regime after 1944 was built on a totalitarian doctrine, where any criticism of the system and any independent thought was considered a potential threat to the state order. This political logic extended beyond the state’s borders, targeting even Albanians living abroad—emigrants whom Enver Hoxha’s regime viewed as potential sources of betrayal, dissent, and subversion.
The Albanian secret service, State Security (Sigurimi i Shtetit), was used as a central instrument to implement these internal policies within the diaspora. This involved a close interweaving of propaganda and repression, in which Albanian embassies, networks of collaborators, and active agents in host countries served as the regime’s extended arm beyond national borders. Domestic policies that promoted complete isolation, fear of “imperialists,” and paranoia toward dissent translated into continuous surveillance and disinformation campaigns targeting the diaspora.
Consequently, any act of dissidence abroad—be it an article in an émigré newspaper, a protest for human rights, or collaboration with international anti-regime circles—was automatically considered hostile and was pursued with intensity by the Sigurimi. Even the silence of emigrants who chose not to engage politically was often met with suspicion.
Psychological and Social Consequences on Albanian Emigrants
The fear-driven and repressive policies exported from Albania to the diaspora had a profound psychological and social impact on Albanian emigrants. The feeling of constant surveillance, fear of potential agents or spies within social or family circles, and anxiety over the fate of relatives back home created a persistent state of paranoia and self-censorship. This was especially true in countries like the USA, West Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, where the political Albanian diaspora had an active presence.
Families who had left behind parents or children in Albania often faced emotional blackmail or direct pressure to cooperate with the Sigurimi. This situation deeply affected the construction of identity and social life among Albanians abroad, manifesting in the form of social isolation, mutual distrust, and the erosion of community solidarity.
Moreover, the collective trauma caused by these policies lingered even after the fall of communism. Testimonies from the Albanian diaspora in the decades following the 1990s reveal a deep silence, fear of speaking about the past, and in some cases, an inability to form healthy social relationships—direct consequences of the institutional fear nurtured over decades.
The Historical Context of the Formation of State Security
The formation of State Security in Albania must be understood as an integral part of the Communist Party’s project to seize and consolidate power after the liberation from World War II. In 1944, immediately after the National Liberation Front—dominated by communists—came to power, the creation of a structured secret service, initially known as the Directorate for the Protection of the People (DMP), became a strategic priority.
The main goal of this structure was not merely to defend the country from “external enemies,” but above all, to identify, persecute, and eliminate any real or perceived internal opposition to the new regime. The creation of the DMP was supported and overseen by Yugoslav and later Soviet advisors, who assisted in organizing surveillance, torture, and ideological control methods.
The Yugoslav and Soviet Model in Building Control Structures
In the early phase, until the rupture with Yugoslavia in 1948, the Yugoslav UDB (State Security Service) served as the model for building and operating the DMP. The Albanian Sigurimi adopted techniques for infiltrating opposition networks, using secret collaborators, systematically tracking “suspicious elements,” and applying harsh interrogation methods.
After the split with Belgrade, Albania turned to the Soviet Union, adopting the NKVD (later KGB) model and transforming the Sigurimi into a comprehensive political repression structure. This Soviet orientation gave Sigurimi an even deeper ideological dimension: any form of ideological deviation—even within the Party—was viewed as a threat to power and had to be eliminated.
Albania became one of the most isolated and repressive countries of the Eastern Bloc, a situation enabled precisely by the dominant role that State Security played in all aspects of public and private life.
Legal Framework Granting Sigurimi Unlimited Powers
The Law on State Security, approved in 1946 and subsequently amended through the 1950s–1970s, formalized a repressive apparatus that operated outside any civilian or judicial control. The Sigurimi had the right to arrest, interrogate, and surveil any Albanian or foreign citizen without accountability. …without needing approval from a court.
In practice, the Sigurimi operated as a state within a state, with a chain of command reporting directly to the Politburo and the supreme leader himself, Enver Hoxha. A large number of internal directives, never made public during the regime, supported its covert activities.
This normative system, which excluded any independent oversight mechanism, granted the Sigurimi free rein to develop extensive operations in espionage, psychological terror, and physical repression—both within the country and throughout the Albanian diaspora abroad.
Historical Context of the Formation of the State Security
The creation of the State Security in 1944 as part of the consolidation of communist power.
The Yugoslav and Soviet models in building control structures.
Laws and regulations that granted the Sigurimi unlimited powers.
The Concept of the “External Enemy” and the Albanian Diaspora
The ideological construction of the internal and external enemy.
The diaspora as “hostile territory”: why it was seen as a threat to the regime.
The stereotyping of political émigrés as “imperialist agents.”
State Security Structures for Controlling the Diaspora
Directorates and departments responsible for activities abroad.
Collaboration with allied Eastern Bloc services (KGB, Stasi, Romanian Securitate, etc.).
The network of agents and “residents” in Western countries.
Methods of Control, Infiltration, and Repression
Infiltration of émigré political organizations (Balli Kombëtar, Legaliteti, Lidhja e Prizrenit, etc.).
Provocations, threats, assassinations, and failed assassination attempts.
Defamation and disinformation campaigns through the Albanian press abroad.
The Role of Embassies and State Security Collaborators
The role of diplomats and attachés in gathering information and organizing operations against emigrants.
The structure of the secret service within Albanian diplomatic missions.
The cases of the embassies in Rome, Paris, Vienna, and Stockholm as operational hubs.
Case Studies from the Albanian Diaspora
The case of Mehmet Shehu (based on theories of opposition elimination).
The assassination attempts on Mustafa Kruja and Abaz Kupi.
The Sigurimi’s network in the USA and Canada: tracking patriotic organizations.
The files of Haki Toska and the testimonies of Iljaz Prokshi.
The Impact of Domestic Policy on Activities Toward the Diaspora
How changes in foreign policy affected the regime’s approach to the diaspora.
The ruptures with the Soviet Union and China, and the regime’s shift toward internal and external control.
Psychological and Social Consequences Among Albanian Emigrants
The constant fear of punishment, surveillance, and retaliation.
The impact on diaspora organization and the creation of an atmosphere of distrust.
The destruction of family relationships through collective punishment.
Developments After the Fall of the Regime (1990–1991)
The destruction of documents by the State Security.
The exposure of collaborators in the diaspora during the 1990s.
The absence of a true lustration and transitional justice process in Albania.
Sources and Bibliography (examples)
Documents from the Central State Archive (Sigurimi files)
Declassified CIA reports on communist Albania
Memoirs of prominent diaspora figures (e.g., Ernest Koliqi, Rexhep Krasniqi)
Academic studies:
Bernd J. Fischer, Albania at War 1939–1945
Nicholas C. Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania
Kastriot Dervishi, Sigurimi i Shtetit 1944–1991
Enver Hoxha, Works (for ideological context)
Historical Context of the Formation of the State Security
After the end of World War II and the seizure of power by the Albanian Communist Party (later renamed the Party of Labour), a totalitarian regime was established based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. In this framework, the preservation of power required the creation of a powerful apparatus of control and repression. Thus, on December 14, 1944, the Directorate for the Protection of the People was established, later becoming the State Security (Sigurimi i Shtetit). This institution was not merely an intelligence service but an ideological and state instrument for eliminating any real or perceived opposition to the communist regime.
Initially inspired by the Yugoslav model of the UDB, the Sigurimi maintained close cooperation with it until diplomatic relations were severed in 1948. Subsequently, the Soviet model of the NKVD (later the KGB) became the primary guide for its structure, function, and operational philosophy. Especially during the 1950s–1960s, the Sigurimi evolved into a comprehensive structure that monitored every aspect of public and private life.
During this period, the Sigurimi:
Operated without any judicial oversight;
Held absolute authority to arrest, convict, and execute without concrete evidence;
Used torture, blackmail, internment, and collective punishment as standard methods of “revolutionary defense.”
Over time, the Sigurimi expanded its mandate to pursue political émigrés abroad, who were considered “class enemies” and linked to “international imperialism.” As such, the struggle for total control extended beyond Albania’s borders to include the Albanian diaspora in Europe, the USA, Turkey, and beyond.
The Concept of the “External Enemy” and the Albanian Diaspora
In the ideological framework of the Albanian communist regime, a strict dichotomy was drawn between the “loyal people” who supported the party and the “class enemy” who had to be eliminated. This division extended beyond Albania’s borders. After the war, many Albanians—particularly political figures, intellectuals, former royal officers, nationalists, and members of the Balli Kombëtar or Legaliteti—fled to Western countries, mainly Italy, Greece, the USA, Turkey, and Austria. These individuals were labeled by the regime as “external enemies of the people’s power.”
For the regime, the diaspora posed a dual threat:
A political and symbolic threat, as many of its members represented the continuity of a pre-1944 Albania and were active in exposing the regime’s repression to the international community.
A practical and operational threat, as in some cases the diaspora was involved in attempts to overthrow the regime through political organizations and cooperation with Western intelligence services (e.g., CIA, MI6), as seen in the failed missions of the 1950s.
In official discourse, the Albanian diaspora was branded with terms like “diversionists,” “agents of American imperialism,” “traitors of the nation,” “political fugitives,” etc. This rhetoric justified aggressive actions: surveillance, infiltration, assassination attempts, and disinformation. Enver Hoxha himself often emphasized in speeches that “the enemy never sleeps” and that “the class struggle continues, inside and outside the country.”
As a result, the Albanian diaspora became a target for the Sigurimi’s covert operations. Senior officials in Albanian embassies abroad worked closely with State Security structures to:
Compile files on political émigrés;
Recruit collaborators within Albanian communities;
Spread mistrust and division within diaspora organizations. Maintaining Power and Preserving the Image of a State Surrounded by “Enemies”
The structures of the State Security were used to organize covert assassinations targeting prominent figures. One significant aspect was the surveillance and control of families of emigrants, who were often used as leverage to influence the behavior of those who had fled the country. If someone in exile made anti-communist statements or engaged politically, their relatives in Albania would face internment, expulsion from school, arrest, or ongoing persecution.
This strategy—built on fear, manipulation, and punishment—created a climate of terror and isolation even within Albanian communities abroad, turning the diaspora into another battlefield for the regime.
During the Communist Era (1944–1991)
The State Security (Sigurimi) was not a homogenous structure but a complex organism with multiple levels and specialized roles. One of its key branches was tasked exclusively with tracking, controlling, and neutralizing the Albanian diaspora in the West. Control over the diaspora was not a spontaneous or occasional effort but a long-term institutionalized strategy originating from the center of power and implemented in a coordinated manner by the Security organs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and diplomatic missions abroad.
The Directorate of Foreign Intelligence
The most important structure for this mission was the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, officially established in the late 1950s as a branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its primary functions included:
Gathering information on the activities of the Albanian political emigration;
Analyzing potential risks from diaspora activities;
Organizing secret operations abroad;
Facilitating collaboration with other Eastern Bloc intelligence services (Stasi, KGB, Securitate, etc.).
This directorate maintained a broad agent network within Albanian embassies, as well as directly recruited collaborators (B.P. – “Bashkëpunëtor i Drejtpërdrejtë”) among Albanian emigrants—often through blackmail or material incentives.
Embassies as Operational Centers
Albanian embassies in capitals such as Rome, Paris, Vienna, Ankara, Belgrade, Stockholm, Bern, and Washington functioned not only as diplomatic missions but as extensions of State Security. Within each, one or more officials were responsible for “operational activity,” including:
Identifying prominent diaspora figures;
Monitoring the activities of associations and political organizations;
Reporting periodically to Tirana on the stances and movements of the diaspora;
Contacting and controlling Albanian citizens living abroad or visiting.
Embassies also served as hubs for coordinating assassinations, transferring funds for secret operations, and establishing fake emigrant organizations to divide the diaspora.
The Agent and Collaborator Network
In addition to official personnel, a critical role in controlling the diaspora was played by infiltrated agents, including:
Escaped Albanians who were later recruited;
Students or workers in Western countries under embassy control;
Community members collaborating for ideological, material, or coercive reasons.
Their tasks included reporting on:
Political activities of emigrants;
Contacts with foreign agencies;
Personal relationships, conflicts, and vulnerabilities of important diaspora figures.
Such data were used for disinformation, disruption, and, in extreme cases, physical punishment or assassinations.
Methods of Control, Infiltration, and Repression
The activity of State Security toward the Albanian diaspora was characterized by both sophisticated and brutal methods, heavily influenced by totalitarian Eastern European intelligence practices. These methods can be divided into four main categories:
1. Infiltration of Emigrant Organizations
A primary goal was to dismantle and weaken political emigrant organizations like the Balli Kombëtar, Legaliteti, the League of Prizren (in exile), the Free Albania Committee, etc. The Security:
Sent trained agents to infiltrate these organizations;
Created parallel (so-called “satellite”) groups to extract information and spread propaganda;
Instigated internal conflicts among diaspora leaders through disinformation, slander, and fabricated lies.
2. Disinformation and Psychological Warfare
Sigurimi used sophisticated propaganda to:
Discredit well-known diaspora figures;
Spread rumors of collaboration with fascists or Western agencies;
Sow mistrust among Albanian communities abroad.
Tactics included anonymous letters, fake press articles in Albanian or Western outlets, and clandestinely published newspapers to shape public opinion.
3. Blackmail and Pressure on Families
A common tactic was the use of families left behind in Albania to pressure emigrants:
If an emigrant showed anti-communist sentiment, their family was expelled from school, interned, or lost employment;
In some cases, Sigurimi attempted to recruit emigrants by offering information about their families or threatening to punish them.
This form of blackmail deeply affected the diaspora’s psyche, causing many to remain silent or isolated.
4. Assassinations and Sabotage
In extreme cases, the regime did not hesitate to order the physical elimination of emigrants considered particularly dangerous. There are numerous documents and testimonies regarding:
Assassination attempts in Italy, France, Turkey, and the U.S.;
Poisoning attempts or staged “accidents”;
Failed kidnappings or attempts to lure emigrants back to Albania with false promises or by force.
Examples include attacks on Xhafer Deva, Abaz Kupi, Hasan Dosti, and Mehmet Gradica, as well as efforts to infiltrate Albanian-American communities—clear evidence of these violent methods.
The Role of Embassies and Collaborators
Albanian embassies during the communist period were not classic diplomatic institutions. They functioned as operational offices for State Security, where diplomacy was subordinated to the objectives of intelligence and political control over the diaspora. Embassies played dual roles: representing the Albanian state and coordinating espionage activities against exiled citizens.
Secret Structures within Embassies
Each embassy included at least one or more officers specializing in “Security matters,” typically holding formal titles like cultural attaché, second secretary, or technical diplomat. In reality, these were:
Officers of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, sent from Tirana to oversee surveillance and penetration into the diaspora;
Responsible for recruiting collaborators, either directly or through intermediaries;
Custodians and distributors of propaganda materials and forged documents produced by Sigurimi.
Often, embassies served as logistical bases for covert operations, including surveillance, disappearances, or assassinations.
Collaborators of State Security in the Diaspora
One of the most powerful instruments of State Security was the network of collaborators recruited within Albanian communities abroad. Recruitment occurred through various means:
Pressure on relatives in Albania;
Blackmail involving documents, residency permits, or previous “moral compromise” files;
Payments or small favors (financial aid, assistance with travel to Albania, etc.);
In some cases, sincere ideological support for the regime.
These collaborators were:
Students sent abroad;
Technical workers or Albanian traders acting for embassies;
Second-generation political emigrants involved in community activities for espionage purposes.
They submitted periodic reports on Albanian political organizations, prominent diaspora figures, and individual attitudes—used to compile files and prepare later actions against them.
Disruptive Activity and Diplomatic Espionage
Many Albanian embassies were involved in creating fake organizations mimicking real political emigrant groups but controlled by State Security. These groups spread pro-regime propaganda and aimed to disorient the diaspora by sowing internal conflicts and collective mistrust.
In some cases, embassies were used to:
Install surveillance in the homes or offices of political emigrants;
Spread false information about diaspora leaders “repenting” or “collaborating”;
Monitor Albanian cultural and religious activities in the West.
Case Studies from the Albanian Diaspora
The study of declassified documents and testimonies from researchers, former Sigurimi officers, and victims reveals several clear examples of this repressive apparatus in action:
Abaz Kupi and Legaliteti in Italy
Abaz Kupi, leader of the Legality Movement and a key figure in Albanian exile politics in Italy, was a constant target:
Infiltration by agents into his circle in Rome;
Assassination attempts;
Disinformation campaigns portraying him as a fascist collaborator.
After his death in 1976, Sigurimi continued efforts to dismantle Legaliteti and fracture his political legacy.
The “Free Albania” Committee and Infiltration in the USA
The “Free Albania” Committee, formed with CIA help by political emigrants in the U.S., aimed to raise awareness about Albania’s situation and prepare for the regime’s fall. Sigurimi managed to:
Infiltrate agents into the committee;
Use double agents to send false information to the CIA;
Spark internal conflicts to undermine leadership credibility.
Ultimately, the Committee weakened significantly and ceased to function effectively by the late 1970s.
Assassinations in Turkey and Greece
In postwar decades, the Albanian diaspora in Turkey and Greece included many early escapees (1945–1955), often with military or political backgrounds. Sigurimi:
Organized attacks on figures like Mehmet Gradica and Hasan Dosti;
Used local networks to track and profile emigrants;
Lured some with promises of “amnesty” and “safe return,” only to arrest them later.
Persecution of Figures in France and Switzerland
In Paris and Geneva—home to many exiled Albanian intellectuals—Sigurimi:
Planted collaborators in cultural circles;
Distributed defamatory articles in foreign Albanian newspapers;
Damaged reputations of former politicians and academics through forged information.
The Silent Victims: Persecuted Ordinary Citizens
Beyond prominent individuals, dozens of ordinary Albanians living in the West were persecuted:
For refusing to return to Albania;
For having contact with anti-communist organizations;
For daring to speak out about repression in Albania.
Many lived under constant surveillance, blackmail, or sabotage attempts—haunted by fear for their safety and their families’.
These cases illustrate not only the efficiency of the Sigurimi network, but also the brutality of a regime that, in the name of protecting “people’s power,” was willing to violate borders, international laws, and the most basic human rights—wherever its citizens may have been.
Sources:
Documents from the Central State Archive (Sigurimi files)
Declassified CIA reports on communist Albania Covert Informants and Surveillance of the Diaspora
These covert informants reported on activities, gatherings, and propaganda deemed hostile to the regime.
Such networks were particularly active in the United States, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, playing a key role in the State Security’s efforts to maintain control over the political emigration.
Use of Propaganda and Protection of the Regime’s Image
Another dimension analyzed by the CIA was the strategic use of propaganda to influence public opinion within the diaspora and to discredit opposition figures.
The Sigurimi orchestrated disinformation campaigns aimed at dividing and weakening the emigrant communities.
Through newspapers, books, and cultural organizations, it attempted to present the regime as unshakable and to justify its repressive measures.
It also established networks of collaborators within international media to counter criticism and defend the image of the regime abroad.
Impact of Interference on International Relations
Reports mention that the Sigurimi’s operations targeting the diaspora had implications not only for the lives of emigrants but also for Albania’s diplomatic relations, including:
Clashes with host countries due to espionage activities and pressure on emigrants.
Violations of national sovereignty through secret operations abroad.
Interference in Albanian communities that often led to diplomatic incidents.
Documents from the CIA and other archives clearly show that the Albanian State Security developed an extensive and systematic repressive apparatus for controlling the diaspora, with deep psychological and social impacts on emigrants.
Future studies may focus on comparing these methods with other communist security services.
Deeper analysis of individual cases of persecution and post-1991 rehabilitation efforts may also yield valuable insights into totalitarian regimes.
Individual Persecution and Efforts for Rehabilitation After 1991
Targeting of Individuals by State Security
Persecution by the Sigurimi was one of the main tools used by the regime to maintain total control over Albanian society and its diaspora. Thousands were labeled “enemies of the people” for reasons often rooted in ideological suspicion—or even personal revenge.
Methods of persecution included:
Constant surveillance, including phone, mail, and physical monitoring.
Defamation and denunciations, often instigated by collaborators within families, workplaces, or social circles.
Arbitrary arrests, torture, and imprisonment in political prisons and internment camps.
Psychological blackmail through pressure on family members.
Social and professional exclusion, leading to complete isolation from public life.
For diaspora members, persecution had a double dimension: in addition to fear of direct repression, they faced continuous pressure on family members back in Albania, which served as a means of control over their behavior and loyalty abroad.
Rehabilitation Efforts After the Fall of the Regime (Post-1991)
Following the fall of the communist regime in 1991, a long and complex process began to uncover the past and rehabilitate victims of political persecution. This involved:
Opening the State Security archives, granting access to information on why and how individuals were persecuted.
Establishing governmental and legal bodies—such as the Human Rights Commission and the Authority for Information on Former State Security Documents—to oversee verification and rehabilitation processes.
Legal and administrative procedures to recognize victims, declare them innocent, and restore their civil rights.
Public awareness campaigns, including the integration of these topics into national education and historical memory.
Obstacles, such as lack of full documentation, institutional resistance, and political disagreement about how and to what extent rehabilitation should occur.
Psychological and Social Impact of the Rehabilitation Process
The rehabilitation process was not just legal—it had important psychological and social dimensions:
For many victims, public and legal recognition of past injustices represented a vital step toward restoring dignity and inner peace.
For families, it meant lifting the generational stigma and reclaiming their name and history.
Yet many former victims remained deeply traumatized, requiring specialized psychological and social support.
Importance for Academic Study and Historical Memory
Studying individual persecution and rehabilitation efforts is crucial to understanding:
How the repressive apparatus functioned on a micro level, destroying lives and communities.
The dynamics of social and political recovery in post-totalitarian periods.
How post-totalitarian societies grapple with the legacy of fear and injustice.
Developments After the Fall of the Regime (1990–1991)
Destruction of Documents by State Security
After the fall of the communist regime, one of the first actions taken by former Sigurimi operatives was to destroy a significant portion of secret documentation. This was done to cover up traces of repression and protect collaborators from public exposure and legal consequences.
Documents were destroyed or relocated in an organized manner, hindering comprehensive investigations into the activities of the Sigurimi—particularly abroad.
This obstructed the transitional justice process and made it difficult to identify collaborators.
Exposure of Collaborators in the Diaspora During the 1990s
In the aftermath of communism, many names of Sigurimi collaborators operating within the Albanian diaspora began to emerge.
Newly uncovered documents and testimonies revealed the networks of agents who had reported on political and cultural activities of diaspora communities.
These revelations shocked emigrant communities, causing deep mistrust and moral upheaval.
Often, collaborators had integrated into public life and civil society, leading to prolonged debates and conflicts over moral and legal accountability.
Absence of a Genuine Lustration and Transitional Justice Process in Albania
Unlike other former Eastern Bloc countries, Albania lacked a clear, comprehensive, and institutional process of lustration and transitional justice.
No strong legal or administrative mechanisms were established to fairly and transparently investigate, punish, and rehabilitate.
New political authorities often avoided confronting the past, due to political interests, potential social consequences, or lack of consensus.
This led to a justice vacuum, where many former operatives and collaborators went unpunished, while victims were left without a full sense of justice.
The process of opening archives and pursuing rehabilitation remained partial and fragmented, impeding true social reconciliation.
Philosophical Reflection on Transition and Collective Memory: The Absence of Transitional Justice in Albania
The fall of totalitarian regimes often marks not only a painful end but also an uncertain beginning. In Albania’s case, as in other post-communist societies, the challenge was not only political transformation but confronting the weight of a repressive past that had shattered lives and belief systems.
The lack of a genuine process of lustration and transitional justice was not merely a political or institutional failure—it was a moral failure, a failure to reckon with the past.
In political philosophy and social ethics, justice is not only a legal act but a moral and existential one—a process of reconciliation and renewal of a society’s collective spirit. Without it, society remains fragmented, and wounds go unhealed.
This absence of justice in Albania raises two fundamental questions:
How can trust and unity be rebuilt in a society where much of the past has been hidden, erased, or denied?
What is the meaning of freedom, if it is not accompanied by truth and accountability?
In the absence of clear answers, Albanian society has embarked on a long and painful journey of self-awareness, where memory and truth are its primary weapons against oblivion and amnesia.
This path is nonlinear, but it is essential for building the foundations of a sustainable democracy—one that cannot rest upon silence and unresolved injustice.
More than a philosophical invitation, it is a historical and moral necessity. Only through honest confrontation with the past and a genuine search for justice can a society ensure a future based on liberty, dignity, and respect for human rights.
Conclusion
The study of the Albanian State Security’s operations in the diaspora (1944–1991) reveals one of the darkest and most complex aspects of the communist regime: the systematic use of the security apparatus to control, monitor, and repress opposition beyond national borders.
These efforts were aimed not only at maintaining power domestically but also at silencing any dissenting voice among the emigrant communities—through espionage, infiltration, and psychological terror.
This policy left deep marks on the psyche and social fabric of the Albanian diaspora—fragmenting communities, fueling fear and mistrust, and affecting the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland.
After the fall of the regime, the challenge of opening the archives, identifying collaborators, and building transitional justice became a long and complicated process.
The lack of comprehensive lustration has hindered the restoration of trust and societal reconciliation.
In this context, the need to “make peace with the past” is not just a philosophical reflection—it is a historical imperative. Only through sincere confrontation with history and a commitment to justice can Albanian society hope to build a democratic future rooted in truth, accountability, and human dignity.
