Albania Today: A Disarmed Nation in an Armed Region
“A nation that abandons the right to defend itself silently renounces the right to exist.”
— Flamur Buçpapaj
For more than three decades, Albania has maintained a minimal, almost symbolic military structure, disconnected from the real needs of national and regional defense. After the tragic year of 1997, when the Albanian state temporarily collapsed and arms depots were looted on a massive scale, the country entered a phase of silent disarmament—driven more by international pressures than by a realistic analysis of the surrounding threats.
This disarmament was not only physical but also conceptual: Albania abandoned the notion of military power as a pillar of sovereignty and embraced an imposed pacifist doctrine, under the illusion that NATO would be its sole and sufficient guarantor of security. The Albanian army was partially reformed, but its role was reduced to symbolic representation in international peacekeeping missions, trainings, and ceremonial exercises. The National Military Doctrine Was Abandoned and Replaced by a Doctrine of Diplomatic Complacency, Believing that NATO Membership Alone Would Ensure Security
The NATO Illusion – Replacing National Defense with Integration Rhetoric
In 2009, Albania became a full member of NATO. This was a diplomatic achievement, but also a tragic turning point in the country’s internal security strategy. Instead of using NATO membership as a foundation to strengthen national defense and fully integrate into the alliance’s military structures, it was used as a justification for inaction.
The Albanian political class created a dangerous illusion: that “now that we are in NATO, we no longer need a strong army.” This approach was not only naive but fundamentally contrary to the philosophy of the Atlantic alliance itself, in which every member state has the obligation to defend itself and contribute to collective defense.
In reality, NATO is not a universal insurance company. It is an alliance where members protect one another based on the capabilities each contributes. A member without a functional army is a weak link—and unfortunately, Albania has chosen to be precisely that link.
The Cost of Disarmament: Compromised Sovereignty and Lack of Influence
Disarmament is not merely a technical or budgetary issue—it carries severe geopolitical consequences:
Albania has lost strategic independence in influencing regional matters. In every crisis involving Kosovo or North Macedonia, it is forced to respond with political statements, not concrete actions.
It has no real influence in NATO decision-making, as it does not offer measurable defense capabilities and remains a merely formal participant.
Albanians in the region feel unprotected, because their homeland lacks the ability to provide real security guarantees or support in times of crisis.
Time to Admit: Disarmament Was a Mistake. It Must Be Corrected Now.
It is time to bravely acknowledge that Albania’s disarmament has been a historic mistake—with severe consequences for national dignity, state security, and Albania’s role in the region.
This mistake can only be corrected through a new vision of national defense, one that views military strengthening not as a threat to peace but as a guarantee of stability. Albania has the human resources, the geostrategic position, and the support of its allies to build a modern and effective army. It lacks only one thing: political will.
And the time to exercise that will is now—before history repeats itself, but without the possibility of defense.
Confrontation with Serbia: Imminent, Inevitable, Unprepared
In the geopolitical landscape of the Balkans, a confrontation between Serbia and the Albanian people is no longer a matter of “if,” but “when.” It is approaching rapidly, with increasingly clear signals, while Albania remains unprepared for a scenario that, without military deterrence, could severely compromise national security.
Serbia has spent more than a decade systematically building its military capacity and modernizing every link of its defense and offensive system. Today, Belgrade is no longer just a political center with nationalist rhetoric—it is a military hub with real potential for conflict. Serbia’s armament is not symbolic; it is functional, strategic, and preparatory for partial or full-scale war scenarios.
Serbia’s New Capabilities: A Real Threat to the Region
Chinese combat drones (CH-92A and CH-95), capable of precision strikes, surveillance, and punitive operations within and beyond Kosovo’s territory.
Russian-supplied missile systems, including the Pantsir-S1 and other hybrid systems, covering the entirety of Kosovo with striking range.
A new fleet of fighter jets, including modernized MiG-29s from Russia and recent acquisitions from France, ensuring air dominance in case of localized conflict.
Joint training exercises with Moscow, not only in technology and logistics but in hybrid warfare, propaganda, cyber warfare, infiltration, and destabilization of ethnically mixed areas.
Powerful intelligence services, closely tied to Russian structures and with active networks in northern Kosovo, North Macedonia, and along the traditional Serbian-Russian axis in the Balkans.
At the same time, Serbia has constructed a propaganda machine with influence in international media, sponsored think tanks, and connections to far-right groups across Europe—all with one aim: to prepare the ground for an intervention justified as “the protection of Serbs” in Kosovo or elsewhere.
Albania: A Defenseless State in a Tense Region
Faced with this alarming development, Albania continues to behave as if it enjoys the luxury of perpetual peace. Without missile systems, without air defense, without meaningful weapons reserves, without a staff prepared for war, and without a command chain tested under emergency conditions, our country holds more of a symbolic than a real position in the event of a crisis escalation in Kosovo.
If a conflict breaks out tomorrow in northern Kosovo—and this is a very real possibility—Albania currently lacks the capacity to respond.
Meanwhile, Albania’s neighbors—Serbia and Greece—have pursued a diametrically opposite path. Both states, aware of the strategic importance of military power in the Balkans, have for years invested in building and strengthening their defensive and offensive capacities.
Serbia, benefiting from continuous Russian support, has become one of the most heavily armed countries in the region. It has purchased combat drones from China, missile defense systems from Russia, and fighter jets from France. This increase in military power is accompanied by nationalist and revisionist rhetoric that never hides its nostalgia for the lost influence over Kosovo or its ambition to reclaim a dominant role in the Western Balkans.
At the same time, Greece—as a consolidated member of NATO and the EU—has steadily invested in modernizing its army. With a high defense budget and unrestricted access to advanced Western military technology, Greece maintains a force trained to NATO’s highest standards, equipped for complex operations in any terrain. It does not hide its interest in maintaining strategic superiority in southern Albania and the Ionian Sea.
In this context, Albania remains defenseless—an unarmed island in an armed ocean. The lack of defensive capacities is neither spontaneous nor inevitable. It is the result of a deliberate internal policy that has prioritized “peace at all costs” and a diplomacy that has believed international friendships can replace a national shield.
This is a strategic mistake. No alliance can guarantee the security of a country that is unwilling to defend itself. NATO is not a replacement for a national army but a system in which each member contributes with its real capabilities.
Today, Albania faces an unavoidable necessity: to exit this phase of self-imposed weakness and to build a modern, effective, and intimidating military force against any potential enemy. In a region where military power defines political weight and international respect, Albania can no longer remain symbolically neutral when the threats are actively real.
The Causes of Albania’s Disarmament – A Historic Mistake
After the 1990s, Albania fell prey to an international policy and internal logic that saw the country as a “special case”—too immature for military strengthening, too dangerous for the region if it pursued a true national defense strategy. The violent transition, institutional collapse, economic downfall, and the anarchy of 1997 were used as a pretext to silently install a doctrine of deliberate disarmament, both from within and from abroad.
The West—especially after the 1997 crisis—treated Albania as a “problematic state” that needed to be stabilized through control and limitation, not by empowering its own capacities. Instead of being supported to build a modern and efficient army, Albania was steered toward symbolic peacekeeping missions and lost its role as a real actor in the Balkan security architecture.
Disarmament Was Not Just Physical – It Was Psychological and Institutional
The disarmament process did not take place only in weapons depots—it occurred in the minds of the political class and within the structures of the state.
The Ministry of Defense was reduced to an administrative body, focused mainly on international relations, logistics, and tendering procedures. The national defense strategy remained on paper—without a budget, without vision, and without implementation.
The Albanian Armed Forces were reduced to ceremonial functions and sporadic NATO mission participation, without any independent territorial defense capacity. Tactical units were downsized, operational commands were fragmented, and military recruitment nearly vanished.
Military academies and the defense education system were weakened to the point of disappearance. New generations were no longer trained as strategic national defense officers but became “military administrators” of international rules.
Minimal Capacity for Organized and Effective Military Intervention in Defense of Kosovo or Itself
Albania currently lacks even the minimal capacity to intervene militarily in an organized and effective way, whether in defense of Kosovo or of its own territory. Any response would depend entirely on the full and immediate intervention of NATO allies—a process that requires time, coordination, and the approval of complex international structures.
But the pressing question remains:
Does Albania have the time to wait when others are in danger—or when its own borders are exposed?
NATO Protects Those Who Protect Themselves
One of the greatest strategic misconceptions in Albanian politics has been the belief that NATO membership provides an absolute guarantee for the defense of every centimeter of national territory. The reality, however, is different. NATO is a military alliance built on the principle of mutual contribution. Each member state is obligated to maintain a minimum capacity for self-defense in order to be a credible and functional partner in a collective response.
Today, Albania is unable to defend even its own land borders—let alone act as a stabilizing factor for Albanians in the region. It lacks an effective air defense system, has no operational reserves for mobilization, no functional naval fleet for coastal defense, and most crucially, no ready national plan for managing a border conflict or escalation in Kosovo.
Confrontation Is Inevitable. Only Preparation Prevents War.
In every serious regional security analysis, a confrontation between Serbia and the Albanian factor is deemed inevitable—unless a real balance of power is established. History has shown that without equal strength, peace is merely a pause, not true security.
To avoid war, Albania must no longer be a “state that hopes,” but a state that deters. And deterrence is built only through military strength.
The Centuries-Old Strategy of Albania’s Neighbors: A Militarily Weak Albanian State
Since Albania’s declaration of independence in 1912, its neighbors—especially Serbia and Greece—have pursued a consistent and unchanged strategic objective: to prevent the emergence of a strong, militarily self-sufficient Albanian state. This strategy is not new; it has been carefully refined and implemented throughout the 20th century and beyond, adapting to changing historical, international, and geopolitical circumstances.
Serbia: A Constant Goal Across Decades – Undermining and Containing the Albanian Factor
Following the loss of control over Kosovo in 1999 and its declaration of independence in 2008, Serbia has never abandoned its ambitions to restore influence in Albanian-populated territories.
Belgrade’s position goes far beyond its refusal to recognize Kosovo’s statehood; it reflects a broader regional strategy aimed at systematically containing the empowerment of Albanians in the Western Balkans. This strategy includes several components:
International lobbying against the militarization of Kosovo and Albania, portraying Albanians as a destabilizing force. In global forums, Serbia has pushed the narrative of a so-called “Greater Albania” to scare Western partners and legitimize restrictions on military support for Albanians.
Strengthening its propaganda apparatus, spreading disinformation that presents Albania as a failed, corrupt, and incapable state—unfit to manage itself, let alone act as a serious military actor.
Active destabilization of northern Kosovo, through parallel structures, armed formations, orchestrated attacks on Kosovo Police, and efforts to maintain a climate of permanent tension—used to justify Serbia’s military readiness along Kosovo’s borders.
Covert and ongoing support for ethnic tensions in North Macedonia, particularly when Albanians there demand expanded political and cultural rights. Serbia views such movements as part of a wider Albanian national project and seeks to counter them through its political networks and regional agents.
Greece: Silent Diplomacy and Influence Through Economic Dependency
While Serbia has used more overt and confrontational methods, Greece has pursued a more sophisticated, silent, and long-term strategy aimed at keeping Albania in a state of dependency and military weakness.
Conditioned economic aid and investments, often used as tools to influence Albanian politics indirectly—especially on sensitive issues like maritime borders, the status of the Greek minority, and Albania’s strategic orientation regarding armament policies.
Ongoing diplomatic pressure against strengthening the Albanian military, under the pretext that increased Albanian military capacity could “destabilize” the region or harm bilateral relations. In reality, Greece fears a militarily strong Albania that could better defend its national interests—including maritime borders and the rights of the Cham diaspora.
Persistent lobbying against Kosovo’s involvement in international military initiatives, using its veto power or influence within Euro-Atlantic structures to block Pristina’s participation in Partnership for Peace or NATO training programs.
Greece clearly understands that a strong Albania would naturally serve as a shield for Kosovo, for Albanians in North Macedonia, and for Albania’s own national interests in the Ionian Sea. Thus, its quiet strategy has been to maintain the old balance of Albanian weakness, in order to preserve Greece’s strategic advantage in the region.
Hostage to a Regional Strategy
When we carefully analyze the actions of Serbia and Greece over recent decades, a bitter truth emerges: Albania is not merely militarily underdeveloped due to a lack of resources or internal will, but because it has been the target of a deliberate, sustained, and successful strategy by its neighbors to keep it out of the game as a military actor.
This strategy must be understood and broken. Because no country can build national dignity without the power to defend itself. And no nation can be free if its security is always in the hands of others.
The Centuries-Old Strategy of Albania’s Neighbors: A Militarily Weak Albania
Since Albania declared independence in 1912, the strategy of its neighbors—especially Serbia and Greece—has focused on one constant and unchanging goal: to prevent the formation of a strong, militarily self-sufficient Albanian state. This strategy is not new but has been carefully crafted and applied in various forms throughout the 20th century and beyond, adapting to historical, international, and geopolitical circumstances.
Serbia: An Unchanging Goal Over Decades — Undermining and Containing the Albanian Factor
After losing control over Kosovo in 1999 and its declaration of independence in 2008, Serbia has never abandoned its ambitions to regain influence in Albanian-inhabited territories. For this reason, Belgrade’s stance has extended beyond mere non-recognition of Kosovo’s statehood into a broad regional strategy aimed at systematically containing the empowerment of Albanians in the Western Balkans.
This strategy includes several components:
International diplomatic lobbying against the armament of Kosovo and Albania, portraying Albanians as a destabilizing factor in the region. In international forums, Serbia has used the narrative of “Greater Albania” to intimidate Western partners and justify limiting military support for Albanians.
Strengthening propaganda apparatuses by spreading disinformation that presents Albania as a failed, corrupt state incapable of self-administration, much less a serious military actor.
Active destabilization of northern Kosovo through parallel structures, armed formations, orchestrated attacks on Kosovo Police, and efforts to maintain a permanent climate of tension that justifies Serbia’s military presence and readiness along Kosovo’s borders.
Silent and continuous support for ethnic tensions in North Macedonia, especially when Albanians there seek expanded political and cultural rights. Serbia views these movements as part of the same Albanian national project and tries to influence regional political structures and agents to neutralize them.
Greece: Silent Diplomacy and Influence Through Economic Dependency
While Serbia has acted more openly and confrontationally, Greece has pursued a more sophisticated, silent, and long-term strategy aimed at keeping Albania perpetually dependent and militarily weak.
Conditioned economic aid and investments, often used as tools to indirectly influence Albanian politics, especially on sensitive issues such as maritime borders, the status of the Greek minority, and Albania’s strategic orientation regarding armament.
Continuous diplomatic pressure against strengthening the Albanian army, under the pretext that increasing Albanian military capabilities could “destabilize” the region or negatively affect bilateral relations. In fact, Greece fears a militarily strong Albania that could better defend its national interests, including maritime borders and the Cham diaspora issues.
Persistent lobbying against Kosovo’s involvement in international military initiatives, using veto power or influence within Euro-Atlantic structures to block Pristina’s participation in the Partnership for Peace or NATO training programs.
Greece understands very well that a strong Albania is a natural shield for Kosovo, Albanians in Macedonia, and Albania’s national interests in the Ionian Sea. Therefore, its silent strategy has been to preserve the old balance of Albanian weakness in order to guarantee Greek strategic advantage in the region.
When we carefully examine the actions of Serbia and Greece in recent decades, a bitter truth becomes clear: Albania is not simply militarily underdeveloped due to lack of resources or internal will, but because it has been subject to a deliberate, sustained, and successful strategy by its neighbors to keep it out of the military playing field.
This strategy must be understood and broken. Because no country can build national dignity without the power to defend itself. And no nation can be free if its security is always in the hands of others.
Albania today stands at a historic crossroads. Its disarmament was not only a consequence of transitional circumstances but a deliberate project fueled by diplomatic naivety, international pressure, and the lack of strategic vision within the political class. In a region that is arming daily and where borders remain fragile, the absence of a functional army is no longer just a lack of strength — it is a lack of will to be free and sovereign.
Facing an increasingly dangerous reality, Albania no longer has the luxury of complacency. Without a new national defense strategy, serious investments in the military, and a revival of the will to be a security actor in the region, we risk becoming a symbolic country on the map, but invisible in power.
Security is not a luxury. It is the first condition of dignity. And national dignity is not defended with words, but with strength.
